The End of the Cold War. 1985-1991

(Sean Pound) #1
PLANS FOR ARMAGEDDON 29

he described military preparations in the Warsaw Pact as ‘science
fiction’.^22 Every sensible commander could see that disaster was built
into the war plans. But whereas Jaruzelski pushed these plans to the
back of his mind while cooperating with the USSR, General Tadeusz
Tuczapski felt that an alternative had to be found to preserve the
Polish nation. He knew that even a small number of nuclear ex -
plosions would wipe out human life in Poland.
After much thought he proposed a demographic precaution that
was nothing if not bizarre:


One time at a training briefing in the General Staff, I was angry
and could not hold back since there was money there that was
returned to the government. I stood up and told Jaruzelski,
‘General, more should be given to Civil Defence so that we could
build a good, solid bunker. Lock up in that bunker a hundred
Polish men – some really good fuckers – together with two hun-
dred women so that we can rebuild the Polish nation. Give some
money for that.’ Of course, Jaruzelski took offence and said, ‘What
are you talking about?’
We were viewing things realistically. We knew what was hap-
pening, what the threat was. We recognized what nuclear war
meant for Poland. Well, we would not have existed after it all.
Neither the Americans nor the Russians would have regretted
that. We could have – I don’t know – got something ready. And,
really, one good bunker should have been prepared so that we
could have eventually rebuilt the Polish nation.^23

The reasons for Jaruzelski’s anger with Tuczapski are unclear. Perhaps
it was a matter of taste and decency for him; or maybe he thought that
Tuczapski was being flippant.
Jaruzelski believed that geography and the sheer distribution of
military power made it sensible for Polish leaders to seek an under-
standing with Great Russia. Confrontation with Moscow could lead to
national suicide. After becoming Party General Secretary, he told Pres-
ident Mitterrand with brutal frankness: ‘Either I condemn my people
to live under the Soviet boot or else I try and gain what I can from the
situation as it is. Are you in the West ready to make war for the sake of
Poland? No. Well, there’s no other course than the one I’m following.’^24
A very different approach to the same problem came from Colonel
Ryszard Kukliński. A Polish patriot, Kukliński had offered his services
to the CIA when he saw the Warsaw Pact’s plans for the kind of war it

Free download pdf