THE REAGANAUTS 39the Senate Armed Services Committee commented on this, and Sena-
tor John W. Warner of Virginia by 1985 emerged as a leading objector
to Weinberger’s demands.^26 All through Reagan’s first presidential term
and beyond, there was a growing concern that the expenditure might
be like pouring money down a drain.^27
The Assistant Secretary in the Defense Department was Richard
Perle. Henry Kissinger would later characterize Perle as ‘a destructive
son-of-a-bitch’.^28 Soviet diplomat Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze
thought that he looked like ‘a Tiflis Armenian’. Coming from a half-
Georgian, this was not exactly a compliment. Tiflis was the Russian
pre-revolutionary name for Tbilisi and in those distant years the
Georgian capital had been economically dominated by its large Arme-
nian merchant class. Feelings between Georgians and Armenians
were so bad that the Georgian communist leadership in the 1920s
implemented a process of ethnic cleansing.^29 Perle had an almost
unearthly calm, never shouting in order to get his way;^30 but his
anti-Soviet ferocity earned him the soubriquet ‘Prince of Darkness’ in
American liberal circles. He was careless of this reputation; if anything,
he liked it.
Neither Weinberger nor Perle had time for anyone who sought to
lower the tensions with the Politburo. Weinberger was furious with
Robert McNamara, one of his predecessors as Defense Secretary, for
demanding a fresh doctrine of war. McNamara and his friends argued
for the need to renounce the ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons against the
USSR and even what became known as ‘hasty second use’. Weinberger
denied that such a policy would enhance national security; he
reasoned that if the Kremlin could cause trouble without risking rapid
all-out retaliation, there would be no likely improvement in its
behaviour. He endorsed the President’s comment that the nuclear
freeze movement in the NATO countries was being manipulated by
people who sought to weaken America. Weinberger thought that
American arms control specialists were a problem in themselves. He
saw them as having an interest in prolonging talks; and if a definitive
treaty were to be agreed between America and the USSR, their jobs
would be put in jeopardy. They might not even be conscious of this
bias.^31 Weinberger wanted Soviet leaders to know that if they started a
war, America would fight as long as it took to defeat the enemy. He
indicated that his Department had contingency schemes for a pro-
tracted conflict.^32
Weinberger bristled whenever there was mention of the idea of