THE REAGANAUTS 41in objecting to the Siberian oil and gas pipeline under construction
through to West Germany – they ignored Haig’s argument that Amer-
ica’s NATO allies in Western Europe would simply refuse to abandon
the commercial deal. Haig gave this summary:
We lifted the controls on three-fourths of our own trade with the
Soviets when we lifted the grain embargo. It would be inconsistent
to put pressure on them when we are loosening our own con-
trols.^37Weinberger refused to give an inch:
We are unequivocally in favor of stopping the pipeline. Leadership
does not add up the columns on the opinions of our Allies, then
conclude you are defeated. You decide what is needed and you do
it. The Europeans should be clear on that. You decide what is
needed and you do it.^38The meeting on 9 July 1981 petered out without a decision.^39
Casey hinted that the President had missed a trick by lifting the
grain embargo:
A cartel of the US, Canada, Australia, and Argentina would con-
trol 78 per cent of all wheat in world trade, 87 per cent of all corn,
and 90 per cent of all soybeans. By way of comparison, the thir-
teen OPEC nations control just 71 per cent of world oil. At current
prices, for about $20 billion – less than one-tenth of the defense
budget – the US could purchase every bushel of grain on the
world market. It should take only a fraction of that to hold farmers
in the American and Argentina harmless from the consequences
of withholding their grain from the Soviet Union. That would be
very powerful leverage indeed but it would be an extraordinary
measure which cannot be taken lightly. It would not be justified
in world opinion unless taken for a very specific and important
purpose.^40
Although Reagan rejected this particular idea, he apparently
welcomed Casey to the National Security Council as ‘a team player’ –
a somewhat eccentric description of a man who rocked any boat he
thought was sailing in the wrong direction.^41
Eugene Rostow, who was appointed as director of the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency, was equally pessimistic about making
progress with the Soviet leadership. As a Yale law professor as well
as a veteran official in Democrat administration, he was a talented