THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE 45rism; they railed against a research programme that would add yet
another stage to the arms race. Reagan’s speech had obviously agitated
them, and there was no Reaganaut who lamented their discomfort.
Weinberger liked the Defense Initiative if only because, as he confided
to his officials, it would increase the economic stress for the USSR
while turning America into ‘a nuclear sanctuary’. He called for parallel
work to continue in building up the country’s strategic offensive
capacity.^11 Edward Teller was one of the leading scientists who had
inspired Reagan to announce the research programme. He knew how
to go about capturing the President’s imagination. He kept up the cam-
paign, writing to him on 23 July 1983 that urgent action was needed
since the USSR might already be ahead in the field.^12 Reagan needed
no persuading. The Defense Initiative provided him with the hope
that he would achieve the protection of his country against attack
by nuclear ballistic missiles. The fact that this caused distress in the
Kremlin was a gratifying bonus.
Meanwhile the Soviet Union was engulfed in its war in Afghani-
stan on the side of the communist government. The American
admin istration made arrangements to deliver military supplies to
anticommunist forces – the mujahidin – which contained a high
proportion of ultra-traditionalist irregulars fighting for Islam, national
sovereignty and the expulsion of foreign infidels. The Americans over-
looked the long-term international danger of fundamentalist jihadism.
Their dominant thought was that aid should go to the enemies of the
USSR. The jihadists were fighting to liberate their country from a
communist despotism propped up by the Soviet Army. They were
fighters who lacked for nothing in determination but were deficient in
weaponry. Reagan wished to assist them. It was prudent to make this
a covert operation. As early as 1981 there was a scheme to use a civil-
ian cargo company registered in Canada. The destination would be
Pakistan via Oman, and permission would be obtained from President
Zia-ul-Haq in Islamabad. Twenty small Cessna aircraft would be
bought to make the regular flights into Afghanistan. The mujahidin
were not going to go down for want of firepower.^13 Weinberger went
in person to Islamabad to discover how the war was proceeding. In
October 1983 he met North-West Frontier Province Governor Fazl-e-
Haq and discussed the huge influx of Afghan refugees.^14
The Soviet leadership turned a calm face to the world about
Afghanistan. But even inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under
Gromyko’s iron rod, the dissenters made themselves felt. The diplomat