46 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Anatoli Kovalëv refused to take over the Near and Middle East desks
because he wanted nothing to do with the Afghan imbroglio. When
Gromyko reasoned with him that the Americans were intent on set-
ting up bases in Afghanistan, Kovalëv stood his ground.^15 Kovalëv
survived in post but it was not always so easy for other officials to
speak truth to power. Experts in the intelligence agency of the armed
forces, the GRU, drafted a report pointing out the grave problems
ahead. The Soviet Union seemed about to repeat the failure of the Brit-
ish in the nineteenth century. The GRU’s boss received a reprimand
from the Politburo and told his subordinates: ‘You guys got me into
trouble!’^16 In fact Gromyko himself quickly began to regret the inva-
sion. In 1982 Yevgeni Primakov, Director of the Oriental Studies
Institute, gave a talk to the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Moscow and
exposed the futility of expecting success in bringing ‘revolutionary
changes’ to Afghanistan. To everyone’s surprise, Gromyko voiced
agreement with Primakov’s criticisms.^17
On 18 August 1983 Andropov, at a reception in Moscow for visit-
ing US senators, said he would end the USSR’s moratorium on
anti-satellite weapon testing if America went ahead with the Strategic
Defense Initiative.^18 He was throwing down a gauntlet. At the same
time he knew that Soviet experts were sceptical about the scientific
chances of American success, and everyone could see that it was going
to require ‘astronomic amounts of money’ from the USSR’s budget.^19
Reagan threw aside Carter’s inhibitions and played the Chinese
card for all it was worth. In July 1981 the Pentagon announced
America’s willingness to give consideration to China’s requests to buy
advanced armaments. Decisions would be taken on a case-by-case
basis.^20 American corporations were eager to set up joint ventures
without concern about technological transfer. The administration
expressed a wish for cooperation in developing Chinese nuclear power
for peaceful purposes. The calculation was that China’s rise would help
America to harass the USSR. The State Department wanted to see the
Chinese spreading their influence around the world and thought that
if they would intervene in Africa, the Soviet Union’s capacity for mis-
chief would be diminished.^21 Although the abuses of human rights in
China were mentioned, they were seldom highlighted. The Americans
saw the Chinese as a bulwark against the USSR’s influence in South-
East Asia; they also liked Beijing’s ability to tie down dozens of Soviet
army divisions along the long border between the two countries.^22
The American administration had few worries about selling advanced