SYMPTOMS RECOGNIZED, CURES REJECTED 57solution, only an indication that things could not continue in the same
old way.
In contrast, Andropov remained somewhat optimistic about inter-
national relations, insisting that détente was not dead but only
moribund. In another unreported comment he noted that Prime
Minister Thatcher had called for both sides in the Cold War to reduce
their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. He stated that the USSR was
certainly not demanding unilateral disarmament by the West.^18 He
gave the impression that the late General Secretary would have
approved of his report. This was a diversion. He really wanted a break
with the past.
When expounding policy to officials in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Gromyko spoke of a cult of the arms race in Washington. He
called on them to believe in the justness of Soviet intentions and
actions. He was repeating a catechism. No cardinal instructed his bish-
ops with greater fervour. He passed over China quickly; the Chinese,
he believed, were uninterested in ‘normalization’ of relations with the
USSR and preferred to stand shoulder to shoulder with the US. There
was therefore no prospect of better links between Moscow and Bei-
jing.^19 Two days later, Gromyko repeated his sermon at a meeting of
the ministry’s party activists. Anatoli Adamishin, head of his First
European Department, felt disturbed by the Minister’s analysis. What
was dispiriting was that Gromyko really seemed to believe his own
words. Adamishin allowed for the fact that the Minister, like the other
‘old men’ in the Politburo, might be saying things to console himself
and others. But if there was any insincerity, there was also self-deceit
- and this was hardly the basis for a sound foreign policy.^20 Gromyko
told the Party Central Committee, claiming that the Soviet Army was
having a ‘stabilizing impact on the situation’ in Afghanistan. He
reported that the Afghan army had kept control of operations even
though there were grounds for concern about the intrusion of foreign
armed units – Gromyko did not specify where they had come from.
He mocked the ‘hysterical campaign’ mounted in the West against the
Soviet military action as a sign that the USSR’s strategy was proving
effective.^21
As early as February 1980, behind closed doors, the Politburo was
starting to search for ways to extricate itself from Afghanistan.^22 But
this was a fitful discussion and Soviet rulers generally thought it
their duty and right to hold on to every gain made by the USSR since