62 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
mischief. While preserving the East European economic lifeline,
Andropov was determined to avoid any indulgence to the Romanians.
The Romanian President Nicolae Ceauşescu held up a Political
Consultative Committee meeting with his objections to the draft sum-
mary communiqué, and no amount of persuasion made a difference.
A Romanian official explained to the Soviet side that Ceauşescu would
give way if the USSR guaranteed close to forty million extra barrels
of oil. This infuriated Andropov, who absolutely refused to accept
Ceauşescu’s proposal. For once, Ceauşescu backed down and signed
the communiqué.^43
The atmosphere at Politburo meetings changed. Open discussion
became normal and lively remarks could be made. But Andropov was
the unchallenged leader, and it was he who summarized the decision
and put it forward for acceptance.^44 This is not to say that the old
rituals entirely disappeared. When Politburo members appeared on
the platform at a Central Committee plenum, everyone still stood to
applaud like schoolchildren.^45 But inside the Politburo and Secretariat
there was a fresh practical urgency of purpose. Andropov liked to hear
about the alternatives before settling his policy even if this meant
hearing some uncomfortable ideas.^46 His Politburo protégé Mikhail
Gorbachëv told him that the state budget was seriously unbalanced; he
recommended the urgent need for a price rise in food and clothing.
Andropov rejected the idea – evidently he thought it dangerous to
annoy Soviet citizens who were less than satisfied with the goods on
sale. There were limits on the kind of changes he found acceptable.
Essentially he opted for the idea of making the current system work
better. He put his emphasis on enforcing discipline in office and
factory and on the farm.
The Politburo was ageing. Andropov and several other members of
the Soviet leadership had health problems. As a result on 24 March
1983 the Politburo updated its orders about the personal routines of
members of the Politburo and the Secretariat and deputy chairmen of
the Council of Ministers. The working day should commence at 9 a.m.
and end at 5 p.m. A break for lunch was obligatory. Any work outside
these hours, including official receptions, should be reduced to a mini-
mum. For leaders over sixty-five there were additional curbs: they
should not start work until ten in the morning and should take two
and a half months’ vacation annually; they were also advised to work
at home on one day every week.^47 Politburo veteran member Arvid