The Postwar Period 173
Djilas and Kardelj came to the meeting in Szklarska Poręba as represen-
tatives of ideological orthodoxy, though they could not entirely dismiss what
Tito had said in a speech to Croatian peasants: “We speak with England and
America, but also with other countries, as equals. We won’t let anyone treat
us like a mere colony.”^128 The general impression in Moscow was that those
words were aimed at the Soviet Union. “On this occasion, too,” the Kremlin’s
observers said, “the Yugoslav leaders will tell us that our objections are based
on misinformation. But they should reread the Borba of 25 May 1945 [Tito’s
speech in Ljubljana], and the newspaper Glas of 28 August 1947 [his speech to
the peasants].”^129 Stalin was convinced that Tito was following an anti-Soviet
policy, and doing so at the precise moment when he should have been support-
ing the USSR as the only power able to prevent, for the time being, a third
world war.
In the constitution of the Cominform, the CPY was mentioned first, prob-
ably in recognition of the fact that the idea had been raised by Tito two years
previously.^130 Stalin himself decided to install the headquarters of the new
organization and its magazine, entitled For a Stable Peace: For the People’s Democ-
racy, in Belgrade. Tito officially interpreted this as proof that his internal and
international policy was right, proclaiming on 27 September, at the Second
Congress of the Popular Front, that its experience was vitally important, not
just at home but also “across our frontiers.”^131 In private, however, he and other
Yugoslav leaders were less than grateful for this honor, complaining behind the
scenes that the CPSU intended to “exploit the Cominform as a means of con-
trol over other parties.”^132
Tito continued to strain Stalin’s patience still further, until his behavior
became completely untenable. He even pretended that he was going to buy
modern weaponry for his army, though the Russians reminded him that Yugo-
slavia could not afford them (as one Soviet officer put it, “Why do you need
a strong army? We’re here!”).^133 Stalin increasingly had the impression that he
was dealing with a bunch of self-serving “Pharisees” in Belgrade who were
ready to praise him in public and denigrate him in private, claiming that the
Bolshevik party had degenerated, that the Soviet Union was no longer revolu-
tionary but was dominated by chauvinism, and that it was eager to “economi-
cally enslave Yugoslavia.”^134 A rumor went around Moscow that “this is not
mere criticism anymore, but strategic backbiting meant to discredit the CPSU
and humiliate the Soviet order.”^135 Kardelj was not exaggerating when he said
later that no socialist leader was as hated by Stalin as Tito. Moša Pijade gave an
accurate assessment of their relations when he said that the 1948 split was a
conflict between a regime with no revolutionary wind left in its sails and a young
revolution, full of energy and enthusiasm.^136