The Postwar Period 189
who was shot in 1938. His crime was having quarreled with Stalin because of
his brutal policy regarding the collectivization of agriculture. In the Soviet
Union, just one of the ideological left- and right-wing errors heaped upon the
Yugoslav leaders would have been enough to put them in front of a firing
squad. The fact that they challenged the admonitions coming from Moscow,
Stalin and Molotov’s letter continued, showed that they considered themselves
as unblemished individuals “who see everything and understand everything.”^213
It also warned that “the Yugoslav leaders should take note that retaining this
attitude means renouncing all friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and
betraying the united socialist front of the Soviet Union and the people’s demo-
cratic republics. They should also take note that this meant depriving them-
selves of the right to demand material or any other assistance from the Soviet
Union, because the Soviet Union can only aid its friends.”^214
Stalin did not limit himself to threats, rebukes, and derision, affirming that,
without the intervention of the Red Army, the Yugoslav Communists would
not have been any more successful than the Italian or the French Communists.
(He reproached Tito and his comrades for behaving in a childish manner and
considering themselves giants for whom “the sea reaches only to the knees.”^215 )
His correspondence with the Yugoslavs was conveyed to other leaders whose
parties were members of the Cominform and to the Albanians, with the re-
quest that they take positions. Everybody, of course, was in agreement with the
Boss, although they were aware that a war was being waged between two
“Caesar isms,” to quote Stella Blagoeva, daughter of the founder of the Bulgar-
ian CP.^216 The first to react, and the most violent, was the secretary general of
the Hungar ian CP, Mátyás Rákosi, whereas the Pole Władysław Gomułka
tried to mediate, but without success. Even Dimitrov—who, when passing
through Belgrade on 18 April on his way to Prague had whispered to Djilas:
“Hold fast”—quickly changed his opinion, declaring that Stalin’s letter of 4 May
was a “marvelous document.”^217 This meant that the leaders of the CPY who
had closed ranks around Tito had already been condemned, and their lives
would have been at risk if they had accepted the invitation to come to the sec-
ond session of the Cominform, in spite of the fact that, in their public declara-
tions, they continued to express their loyalty toward Stalin. Although Stalin did
not send his best wishes on 25 May, the marshal’s birthday, three days later
Borba wrote that “Tito was the Soviet Union’s best friend” and that “his love for
the first socialist country was the spark that lit the flame of love and faith of our
peoples toward the Soviet State.”^218 However, the leaders of the CPY refused
to take part in the session of the Cominform, stating in a short message to
Stalin on 17 May that they felt in a condition of “total inferiority.”^219 In order
to persuade them to come, Stalin sent Colonel Vasilii V. Moshetov to Belgrade.