The Postwar Period 197
Yugoslav Communists to rebel and eventually to ask for the “brotherly” help of
the Eastern troops.^247
The news of Jovanović’s death was published by Borba on 18 August, the
day the Danube Conference closed its doors, which served as marching orders
from the Yugoslav authorities to Ana Pauker and Vyshinskii, who left Bel-
grade empty-handed. The reaction to this unexpected announcement was
immediate and extremely violent, akin to the press campaign unleashed some
weeks earlier on the occasion of an assassination attempt against Togliatti.
On 20 August, the Romanian agency Ager Press wrote that Jovanović had been
the victim of a “vile murder” and, in a note reprinted by all the newspapers,
accused the “treacherous Tito-Ranković clique ” of using “Hitler-type meth-
ods.” Similar suppositions, which also circulated in Belgrade, came from other
sides as well: in Hungary, the party secretary, Mátyás Rákosi, protested in hys-
terical tones against the terror instituted by the Yugoslav leaders, who were, in
his words, killing the most sincere democrats and heroes of the liberation
struggle: “Today in Yugoslavia the supporters of the Soviet Union and of the
international proletariat are hunted like game.”^248 Although the Soviet media
stayed out of the press campaign, it nevertheless got even worse over the fol-
lowing days. On 24 August, the newspaper Scînteia published a long article by
the former ambassador, Golubović, who branded the leaders of the CPY as a
“band of assassins and criminals” who used Fascist methods worthy of Hitler,
Mussolini, and Franco.^249
Golubović’s article was the last straw for the Yugoslav leaders. Until then
they had tried to show that, notwithstanding the falling out between the Par-
ties, they stood loyal to the socialist camp. In the polemics with the Comin-
form press, their newspapers simply replied to the attacks in a more or less
defensive manner. However, because of the accusations that poured in from
the Eastern capitals after Jovanović’s death, the Belgrade government felt it
was time to change their tune. It went on the offensive with an official note on
25 August to the Romanian Interior Ministry. The note declared the behavior of
the highest Romanian leaders “unacceptable,” starting with “lady” Ana Pauker,
who openly dared to urge the Yugoslav Communists to overthrow Tito and his
comrades. It was obvious that the relations between the two states would be
gravely compromised as a result. Moreover, the disgraceful activity of the “insti-
gators” weakened the position of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the imperialist forces,
strengthening their pressure on a socialist country. The following day, a similar
note was sent to the Hungarian government, which was also partic ularly hos-
tile toward Yugoslavia.^250 The implicit conclusion of the Belgrade government’s
argument was obvious: if the socialist front in the Balkans and Central Europe
collapsed, Yugoslavia would certainly not be to blame.