The Postwar Period 209
personalities to move to Topola, in Šumadija. In the meantime, he began trans-
ferring food, arms, archives, and even entire industries into the center of the
country.^303 He ordered Svetozar Vukmanović (Tempo) to organize Partisan
units that would stay and fight in the occupied areas in case of invasion. The
main army forces, about 275,000 men, were to withdraw to the massif stretch-
ing from Bosnia to the sea, since only there would it be possible to organize
an efficient defense. Maximum efforts were dedicated to the army, which got
50 percent of the 1949 budget.^304
After seriously thinking it over, Stalin abandoned the idea of military inter-
vention in Yugoslavia. According to Nikolai A. Bulganin, full member of the
Politburo and marshal of the Soviet Union, “he did not strike” mostly because
of the opposition of the Red Army top brass, who were aware that such a move
could degenerate into a third world war.^305 Tito and his comrades, however,
did not know this: it was only later, in 1951, that Pietro Nenni, the leader of the
Italian socialists, informed them that Stalin had confided to him that he was
willing to use every possible means against the Yugoslavs, short of an armed
attack. To this end, he organized a special general staff in Bucharest who were
appointed to plan sabotage activity, border incidents, and troop movements, in
order to keep the pressure constant. The Yugoslavs, exasperated and convinced
that the attack could come at any moment, tried to strengthen their defenses,
using methods both licit and illicit. They reacted to the economic boycott, which
heavily undermined the country, by organizing a smuggling network, flagrantly
violating international rules.^306 To stop the advance of the enemy on Belgrade,
they prepared an audacious plan that envisaged the destruction of the Djerdap
Dam on the Danube and the flooding of the Pannonian plain.^307 At the diplo-
matic level, they decided to denounce the aggressive policy of the Soviet Union
in the UN General Assembly, distancing themselves from Russia for the first
time in this forum. Kardelj’s speech at the Assembly in September 1949 accused
Moscow of hegemonic ambitions, and created shockwaves with the announce-
ment that from then on, Yugoslavia would follow an “independent” foreign
policy.^308 Since the Americans too feared an attack of the Soviet bloc against
Yugoslavia, in October 1949 they decided to support its candidacy to a pro-
visional seat on the Security Council. This maneuver was successful despite
the furious opposition of the Soviet Union, which favored the candidacy of
Czechoslovakia. Its representative, Andrei Vyshinskii, did everything possible
to accomplish Stalin’s will but remained isolated in the General Assembly. On
20 October 1949, Yugoslavia was called to participate in the Security Council for
four years, which meant that it would be among the judges of the Soviet Union
in case of military action. The Yugoslavs triumphed, hailing Kardelj upon his re-
turn from New York “as a Caesar.”^309 The Americans and their allies cele brated