The Postwar Period 215
regarding the reorganization of the People’s Army. Tito accepted Washington’s
request to deploy his best troops at the Ljubljana gap, thus reinforcing NATO
defenses in northern Italy.^337
The new relations with the West guaranteed a significant increase in eco-
nomic and military aid to Yugoslavia, which began in July 1951 with a “tripar-
tite” agreement between the United States, Great Britain, and France.^338 The
Soviets denounced this as a betrayal of socialism: on 22 July, Molotov affirmed
in Warsaw that Yugoslavia was in the clutches of spies and criminals, ready to
sacrifice its own people to install capitalism. This accusation caused Tito to lose
his temper. On 27 July, on the anniversary of the start of the Partisan resistance
in Bosnia, he replied more harshly than he ever had before, not just defend-
ing the socialist character of his regime, but openly attacking Stalin’s tyranny:
“With what right does [Molotov] speak, he who is one of the most important
leaders of a country where an unheard of genocide is happening, where entire
nations are destroyed before the eyes of the whole world?”^339
In another speech, Tito sang the praises of the United States, proclaiming
them the world’s only champion of liberty.^340 This paean did not, however,
signify that the marshal had renounced his political autonomy on the strategic
field, and when the Americans asked him to concentrate his army in defense of
the Ljubljana gap and the Vardar Valley, he refused, stating that his duty was to
defend the entire country, not just the areas important to the West.^341 In Wash-
ington, where the Truman administration wanted to include Yugoslavia organi-
cally in its military structure, such independence was not greeted favorably. The
following summer the United States, Great Britain, and France sent Tito a
document informing him that he would no longer get “free” economic aid. In a
meeting with the American ambassador, George W. Allen, the marshal observed
that he did not like the tone and the spirit of this communication, stressing that
if this attitude did not change, Yugoslavia would renounce Western help, even
if it meant it had to “tighten its belt.”^342 He was able to react so firmly because
he knew he had vast popular support. This was confirmed by a survey orga-
nized by the American and British embassies that showed how popular Tito
was, even among those groups that opposed communism. The authority and
energy that Tito displayed in moments of crisis strengthened the unity of the
Yugoslav peoples, in spite of their many ethnic and ideological differences.^343
At the beginning of the fifties, Washington seriously considered the inclusion
of Yugoslavia in NATO. The Americans had no doubt Tito’s soldiers would
“cut a good figure” in case of a Soviet attack.^344 One of the reasons why this
ideal was not implemented was because of Italian opposition, since the Rome
government was not eager to have as a military partner a country with which it