The Postwar Period 217
to Ankara and Athens in February and July 1954, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Tur-
key signed a pact of mutual aid in case of attack the following August at Lake
Bled. It thus became part of that defense structure Washington was trying to
consolidate in Southern Europe against the Soviet threat, and received the
same guarantees as the NATO members, without subjecting the People’s Army
to its command.^350 “I do not know whether this pact will defend us,” said Tito,
when the consultations were still in progress, “but it is an admonition to Stalin
not to do foolish things in the Balkans if he does not wish to set off the third
world war.”^351
The Degeneration of the
Trieste Question and Its SolutionAmerican foreign policy aimed at making NATO’s southern wing more
compact achieved another important result in the same period: the “London
Memorandum of Understanding,” signed on 5 October 1954, which brought to
an end the conflictual situation between Italy and Yugoslavia of past years. The
solution to the thorny Trieste question that until then had hindered Belgrade’s
collaboration with the defensive structures of the West seemed to lay the foun-
dations for the friendly coexistence of the two neighboring countries.^352
Because of the dispute related to the Free Territory of Trieste, Tito had
become increasingly hostile to Italy in the postwar years, accusing it of irreden-
tist claims in the Eastern Adriatic. The dispute came to a head in mid-August
1953, when Alcide De Gasperi’s government in Rome was replaced by Giuseppe
Pella’s, which was decidedly oriented to the right. In Pella’s inauguration speech
to the Italian parliament, he asked the Western Allies to implement the “Tri-
partite Note” of 18 March 1948, which invited the Soviet Union to review the
peace treaty regarding Trieste. At that time, the United States, Great Britain,
and France believed that the entire Free Territory of Trieste (FTT) should be
returned to Italy. Between March 1948, when Yugoslavia was still part of the
Soviet bloc, and August 1953, when it was de facto a part of the Western bloc,
the situation had changed radically. For internal political reasons, however, the
Italians were not ready to admit it. Once in power, Pella decided to move from
words to deeds, ordering the deployment of three armored divisions and a
parachute unit near Monfalcone and Gorizia on the border with the FTT and
Yugoslavia. He did not inform NATO about this move, although he should
have. Unbeknownst to the Allies, he gave a green light to Operation Delta,
which planned for the occupation of Trieste by Italian troops. Since, in that
case, a clash with Yugoslavia was probable, the Italian General Staff planned an
even a larger maneuver, which was to involve the entire area ceded in 1947 to
Yugoslavia by the peace treaty.^353