218 The Postwar Period
Tito replied to this provocation with one of his best-known speeches. On
6 September 1953 he took part in a Partisan rally not far from the border near
Gorizia commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Italian capitulation. In
his dashing white admiral’s uniform, he stressed that the Yugoslavs did not fear
the Italian “heroes” and their “wooden swords.”^354 These intentionally offensive
words sparked a heated polemic that convinced the British and the Americans
that the Trieste question would not be solved without their radical interven-
tion. They therefore decided of their own volition to give Zone A, which they
administered, to Italy, whereas Zone B would remain with Yugoslavia. The
diplomatic representatives of Great Britain and the United States informed
Pella and Tito about this drastic decision the same day, on 8 October 1953. The
latter, when notified of the “Bipartite Note,” kept calm, observing only that the
Italians would not be satisfied with Zone A, but would continue in their irre-
dentist claims: the “Bipartite Note” would not eliminate the existing tension
between the two countries. Although he said goodbye to the two with a smile,
he was furious at having had a fait accompli put before him without previous
consultation. All the more so as Pella proclaimed the “Bipartite Note” a victory,
whereas Tito felt it was a “kick in the shin,” saying, “We cannot sell our country
for their aid.”^355 Under pressure from those who reproached him for the fail-
ure of his Western policy, and fearing loss of prestige, he reacted decisively. On
10 October in Leskovac, southern Serbia, he declared to an enormous crowd
that Yugoslavia would defend its interests, if necessary, even with arms, and that
he considered the “entrance of the Italians in Zone A as an act of war.” The
following day in Skopje, he specified that the moment the first Italian soldiers
stepped into Zone A, the Yugoslav troops would do the same. If American aid
depended on accepting the “Bipartite Note,” Yugoslavia was ready to do with-
out.^356 Meanwhile, in Belgrade and in other localities, demonstrations broke
out, in part spontaneous, in part prearranged, with people shouting slogans:
“Give us arms, we will go to Trieste!” or “We are ready to give our life, but not
Trieste!” It was all accompanied by a bellicose press campaign that stirred up
popular support, and by the marshal’s decision to order ninety thousand reserv-
ists to be called up to reinforce the army along the Italian border.^357
Winds of war started to blow along the border, preoccupying all parties
involved. As in previous difficult situations, Tito once more took the initiative.
On 25 October 1953, he sent a message to London and Washington via Fitzroy
Maclean: he could not accept a diktat by the Allies because this would endan-
ger his position at home. Therefore, he was forced to take a more radical line
than he would have liked, which did not mean that he was not ready to com-
promise. He declared that he would accept a division of the contested area
along the existing frontier between Zones A and B, provided that Yugoslavia