The Postwar Period 219
would get a port near Trieste along with the territory already in its posses-
sion. Also, it would be helpful if the Allies declared that they would renounce
support of any further Italian claim.^358 Secret talks on this basis began in Lon-
don on 2 February 1954 between Yugoslav ambassador Vlatko Velebit, Foreign
Office representative Geoffrey W. Harrison, and the American ambassador to
Vienna, Llewellyn E. Thompson. They were the result of intense diplomatic
consultations behind the scenes that had begun in mid-January on the premise
that it was necessary to find a solution for the Yugoslavs that was better than
the “Bipartite Note,” but that was not worse for the Italians.^359 Discussions con-
tinued until September 1954, even requiring last-minute intervention by Presi-
dent Eisenhower. The main obstacle to an agreement regarded a minor revision
of the frontier between Zones A and B in favor of Yugoslavia, which inflamed
tempers. To calm them down, the president sent State Department Deputy
Undersecretary for Political Affairs Robert Murphy, an old acquaintance of
Tito’s, to Belgrade and Rome. He arrived in Belgrade on 14 September 1954 and
had immediate talks with Kardelj and Bebler, but without any results. In fact,
Murphy tried to link the solution of the territorial controversy with the supply
of wheat, which Yugoslavia needed badly. The answer was the usual one: “The
marshal would prefer to tell his people that this year they will starve, rather
than accept territorial losses in exchange for food.”^360 Tito, flattered by Eisen-
hower’s letter and the fact that he complimented him for his “statesmanlike”
qualities, was more malleable. Although he stressed once again that the ques-
tion was “dynamite” from the domestic point of view, in the end he accepted
the territorial adjustments the Italians requested in spite of Kardelj’s angry
protests. On 18 September, Murphy left for Rome with proposals acceptable to
the Italian government.^361
By the end of September 1954, the agreement was complete in every detail,
and was signed on 5 October at the Foreign Office in London. On that occa-
sion, British foreign minister Anthony Eden said with satisfaction that it was
“a public understanding achieved secretly.” This was not completely true, since
the text was accompanied by a series of confidential letters that were not pub-
lished.^362 Above all, the character of the agreement remained in question, since
it was an international treaty, although not classified as such. It did not abolish
the FTT de jure, but only de facto. In short, it was an ambiguous document
that did not eliminate Article 22 of the Paris Peace Treaty, but limited itself
to transforming the “temporary” administration of the two Zones of the FTT
from military to civil, replacing the Anglo-Americans in Zone A with the Ital-
ians. Tito was, by and large, satisfied with the memorandum, as is evident from
his observation that, although the Slovenes and Kardelj had not imagined their
request for the port city of Capodistria/Koper would be honored, “We fought