Tito and His Comrades

234 The Postwar Period

they did not deviate from their line: on 13 January 1953, they issued a series of
amendments to the 1946 Constitution that confirmed the reforms they had
adopted, further distancing Yugoslav society from the Soviet model, and exalt-
ing, above all, its “self-managed democracy.” The new law foresaw two par-
liamentary chambers, a Federal Council and a Producers’ Council (workers’
representatives), which according to Kardelj would become “the instrument of
class policy,” whereas the old Nationalities Chamber would become just an
appendix of the Federal Council. The supreme governing body, which from
now on would be called the Executive Council, would have forty-three mem-
bers, of whom thirty-seven were elected and six were nominated by the repub-
lics. Its president should be, at the same time, president of the federation and
commander-in-chief of the army. This office was assumed, of course, by Tito,
who formed a new government whose members were now called secretaries
rather than ministers.^422 Cultured, refined, but arrogant, Koča Popović became
secretary for foreign affairs. He traveled to London with Tito in this capacity
on the marshal’s first visit to the West, at Churchill’s invitation, once the Brit-
ish prime minster had returned to power again after 1951. The two statesmen
agreed upon a common defense policy, assuming that an attack on Yugoslavia
would be part of a general attack in Europe.^423 As usual, Churchill summarized
this with a sentence full of eminently quotable rhetoric: “If Yugoslavia, our ally,
will be attacked, we will fight and die with you.” Tito, for his part, assured
Churchill that his country was part of the “free world,” although this could not
yet be loudly proclaimed.^424

Slowing Down the Democratization

Tito went to Great Britain on his yacht, the Galeb (Seagull). The “good” news
about Stalin’s death reached him before he left Montenegrin waters. During
the following months, this sudden event influenced his policy in a decisive
way. According to Djilas, before Stalin’s death he adopted the line proposed by
his more intellectually daring comrades, but abandoned it after Stalin died as
a burden and a threat to his own power. Even during the years of his tug-of-
war with Stalinism, he reacted with irritation if someone in his circle displayed
doubts about the socialist character of the Soviet Union and, consequently,
about socialism in Yugoslavia. “Sometimes it seemed,” Djilas affirmed, “that he
played the prophetic role of a high priest to the schismatics.”^425
Yugoslav leaders, Tito above all, hoped that, after Stalin’s death, a power
struggle would erupt in the Kremlin that would lessen the pressure on their
country. When this actually happened, Tito was quick to use the occasion to
slow down the democratization process and to once again subject the party to
his will. As time went on, he was less and less ready to recognize his faults and