264 The Presidential Years
a Social Democrat.”^2 From Suslov’s point of view, Kardelj was a traitor to com-
munist doctrine as preached by Moscow, which was based on the conviction
that capitalism and socialism were antithetical realities. This negative judg-
ment would remain: Kardelj was put on the black list of Soviet enemies and
was constantly monitored in all he did and wrote. His speech was disliked by
many in Belgrade too, where after Stalin’s death unfavorable comments about
the Sixth Congress’s reform program could be heard, and even requests that “all
this rubbish should be liquidated.”^3
Kardelj was unsuccessful in his attempt to court European social democratic
leaders during his trip to Scandinavia, Germany, and France. They were inter-
ested in a collaboration with Yugoslavia but were not ready to recognize the
Socialist Alliance of Working People as one of their members, asserting that
it was impossible to accept an organization that was opposed to political plu-
ralism and whose unions renounced to the right to strike.^4 The fact that they
were denied inclusion in the Socialist International was profoundly disap-
pointing for Yugoslav leaders, who were just beginning to have significant suc-
cesses abroad. For instance they had overcome the Trieste crisis, settling for a
policy of collaboration with Italy. They had put the split provoked by Stalin
behind them, largely thanks to Moscow’s initiative. With the “Belgrade Decla-
ration,” signed on 1 June 1955 after intense and dramatic discussions with
Khrushchev, they had a document that was potentially important for the entire
communist camp. It recognized Yugoslavia’s right to build socialism in its own
way, in harmony with its specific needs. This was a victory for Tito’s belief that
every socialist country was sovereign, although it did not signify that all fric-
tion between Moscow and Belgrade had been eliminated. By making verbal
concessions on sovereignty, Khrushchev had hoped during his “Canossa pil-
grimage” to induce the Yugoslavs to return to the “camp” and join the Warsaw
Pact, the recently instituted military alliance. But, as Tito said, he and his com-
rades were not ready to discuss a reinstatement of Muscovite hegemony from
“the Adriatic to Japan.”^5 This, Khrushchev later said, “kindled an explosive
spark in our relations.”^6 Invited by the latter to liven up the farewell reception,
famous opera singer Galina Vishnevskaya vividly illustrated in her memoirs
the atmosphere that prevailed at the close of the Soviet visit to Belgrade. When
Comrade Khrushchev, already tipsy, started to dance, Tito did not follow his
example.^7
The Discovery of Non-AlignmentKhrushchev’s pilgrimage to Canossa resulted in Tito’s victory thanks to the self-
confidence he had acquired some months earlier during his trip to India and
Burma. The Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Burmese prime