268 The Presidential Years
On 21 December 1954, Tito gave an important speech to the Indian parliament
in which he developed his thoughts about a non-aligned policy. He started by
listing the four main dangers of the contemporary world: inequality between
nations and states, interference of great powers in the internal affairs of third-
world countries, division of the world into spheres of influence, and colonial-
ism. He confirmed his belief that non-aligned states should close ranks on a
global level, and admonished those who had liberated themselves from colo-
nialism not to be bewitched by Muscovite sirens. If they wanted economic
emancipation from their former masters, they had to strengthen their mutual
collaboration. He finished by hailing the “active coexistence” that would be able
to create a new equilibrium in the world.^23
Tito was aware of just how audacious his policy was, as shown by an infor-
mal conversation he had with his comrades and journalists on a train after his
visit to Calcutta: “What could small Yugoslavia do alone, without being backed
up by a great country? So we try to find allies. This is the aim of our trip. Oth-
erwise, why go so far? Certainly not to go hunting tigers.” This was his reply to
the insinuation made by a newspaper that he had only come to India to hunt
tigers—which he had, but armed only with a camera.^24
Tito returned from India and Burma conscious that Yugoslavia had new
political possibilities far beyond mere European dimensions. After his return,
he spoke his mind in a speech at the Zagreb railway station, where he was
welcomed by a large crowd. Feeling a favorable wind in his sails, he proclaimed:
“We know that today we have numerous friends in Asia, that our country
enjoys enormous prestige there. Our people have earned this respect with their
fight, with their work.”^25 This kind of boasting declaration, which further exalted
the right of colonial countries to be independent, was not accepted with enthu-
siasm in the West. The more so since it was accompanied by Tito’s pledge
in Rangoon to supply the Burmese army with weapons. The president of the
Commission for International Affairs in the US Senate, Walter George, warned
Tito that he risked losing Washington’s aid if he insisted on this path.^26 These
more or less veiled threats did not deter the marshal, all the more so since
Nehru was ready to collaborate with him, especially when he realized how
respectfully the Yugoslav president was treated by the Soviets. During a visit to
New Delhi, Anastas Mikoyan, a member of the Politburo, spoke in flattering
terms about Tito, stressing that he had helped the Soviets to understand India.
This impressed Nehru very much: the following day, he informed the Yugoslav
ambassador that he would accept Tito’s invitation and visit Brioni.^27
On 18 and 19 July 1956, the leader of the world’s biggest democracy took part
in a meeting with Tito and Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser that ended
with a declaration that was destined to become the cornerstone of what would