The Presidential Years 271
The same day, Molotov, who had opposed the rehabilitation of the Yugoslav
heretics, had to step down as minister of foreign affairs, an eloquent sign that
Khrushchev wanted to receive Tito as a prodigal son. In fact, he was greeted
with a solemnity not seen since the October Revolution. In Stalingrad and Kiev,
he was hailed by several hundred thousand people, in Leningrad more than a
million. The sincere enthusiasm of the masses, attracted by Tito’s informal but
gentlemanly behavior and by Jovanka’s Paris-style elegance, created an excited
atmosphere that involved even the seasoned and cynical Soviet leaders.^40 As
Ambassador Veljko Mićunović wrote, Kliment Voroshilov, Nikolai Bulganin,
Anastas Mikoyan, Lazar Kaganovich, and even Viacheslav Molotov competed,
under Khrushchev’s direction, to condemn Stalin’s policy toward Yugoslavia as
firmly as possible. However, although Khrushchev, trying to please his guests,
stated publicly that “the Republic of Yugoslavia, too, builds socialism with suc-
cess,” this did not mean that he was ready to go along with their wishes. On the
contrary, during a mass meeting at the Dinamo football stadium, where he and
Tito spoke on 19 June, he endeavored to create the impression that Yugoslavia
had returned to the “socialist camp” and its “monolithic unity.” Tito hurried to
correct him, stressing that he had no intention of relinquishing his autonomy
and reaffirming that “our way is different from yours.”^41
Tito’s intention was to top off his visit with the “Declaration,” which would
recognize not just the equality of the CPSU and CPY but of all other com-
munist parties.^42 The Soviets, who had already refused these proposals in Bel-
grade, did not agree. They wanted to persuade the Yugoslavs that “ideological
unity” among the parties was needed, which meant, in other words, that the
LCY should join the fold. Khrushchev and his comrades were convinced that
Yugoslavia’s adherence would improve relations between other socialist coun-
tries and strengthen their own position in the Kremlin. As much as Tito desired
to support Comrade Nikita against the Stalinist forces that were still active in
the Soviet Union and in the popular democracies, he could not accept such
proposals, nor the concept of a “camp,” as it recalled Stalin’s dictatorship and was
“an obsolete form of organization.”^43 An excited and sometimes sour discussion
was sparked between the Soviet and Yugoslav delegations, which ended just an
hour before the final ceremony. It was clear that the failure of the talks would
reveal Khrushchev’s frailty in a moment when the political situation in Poland
and Hungary was menacing.^44 In the end, the Moscow Declaration, signed on
20 June 1956 in Saint George’s Hall in the Kremlin, appeared to be a compro-
mise, recognizing the equality of socialist states and mutual non-interference in
internal affairs, and accepting “the variety of socialist development in the spirit
of the internationalist principles of Marxism-Leninism.” However, it did not
explicitly state the equality of all parties, which is what Tito and his comrades