272 The Presidential Years
had had in mind. Nevertheless, it was an extraordinary concession, and poten-
tially dangerous for the Soviets. As Khrushchev said: “It would not be possible
to grant to others what has been granted to the Yugoslavs.”^45
Uprisings in Poland and HungaryWhen the Yugoslav delegation left Moscow, the Soviets immediately let it be
known that they were not ready to abdicate their guiding role in the socialist
camp. Even before Tito returned to Belgrade, on 22 and 23 June 1956, Khrush-
chev had gathered the top satellite leaders, totally ignoring the Moscow Declara-
tion that had been so recently signed. “And nobody,” wrote an indignant Veljko
Mićunović in his diary, “had any objection or question.”^46 If this way of work-
ing did not displease the Soviet vassals, since it confirmed the status quo and,
with this, their power, it was not so with the Eastern European peoples, who
had understood Tito’s visit as a “third Russian revolution” bound to improve
their living conditions. Tito had not yet left the Soviet Union when clashes
occurred between workers and police in Poznań, Poland, on 28 and 29 June,
which took on the characteristics of an uprising. This dramatic event weakened
Khrushchev’s position at home, encouraging those who disagreed with his
policy. Proclamations about “international proletarian solidarity” and about the
need to close ranks against “capitalist machinations” appeared in the press.^47
Westerners were not able to see the link between the rehabilitation of Yugo-
slavia and Polish events. The fact that the Yugoslavs endorsed the Soviet inter-
pretation of Poznań as the result of foreign reactionary meddling strengthened
their conviction that there was a fundamental understanding between Tito and
Khrushchev against the West.^48 In Washington, London, and other capitals of
the “free world,” Tito’s entente cordiale with the Soviets caused worried dis-
putes and debates. An amendment to a law about foreign aid from which Yugo-
slavia was excluded, discussed in the Senate on 29 June, indicated the hostile
climate developing against him in the United States. The law was rejected, but
the amount of aid to Yugoslavia was halved, and President Eisenhower was
charged to bestow this aid only if he was certain that this was in the interest of
the United States. Tito was alarmed by this news because if this attitude pre-
vailed, he risked losing other kinds of American support too, such as the grain
supplies that were essential for his regime. He sent Eisenhower a secret letter,
in which he assured him that he considered the president’s friendship more
important than American aid. During a meeting with Ambassador Riddle-
berger, he pointed out that his policy of good relations with the socialist coun-
tries would help to free them from Stalinism by showing them that it was
possible to have a different stance than that dictated by Moscow.^49 Those sweet