The Presidential Years 273
words had some effect on the short-term decisions of the president, but did not
eliminate further moments of tension between the two countries, tensions that
were constant in their complex relationship. The fact that Yugoslavia received
arms worth $717 million during the period of 1951–56, and worth only $16 mil-
lion during the period of 1956–63, is telling.^50
As much as he tried to calm Western apprehensions, Tito continued to
reproach them for not understanding the new situation created in the Soviet
Union was due to his influence. “The devil is sometimes not as black as painted,”
he told the American ambassador.^51 The drive to be a bearer of new values in
international relations pushed him to intensify his contacts with African and
Asian countries, but also to act against Stalinist remnants in the satellite states.
In Poland, he supported Gomułka in his endeavors to bring about reform. In
Albania, he conspired against Enver Hoxha, in Bulgaria he tried to overthrow
Valko Velev Červenko, in Romania he aided the adversaries of Gheorghiu-Dej.
His hostility was directed mostly toward the political leadership in Hungary,
where he tried to undermine the dictatorship of Mátyás Rákosi, his old enemy,
and replace him with Imre Nagy, who had served a long prison sentence for
“Titoism.”^52 His efforts to free Hungarians from the “Stalinist nightmare” were
only partially successful, since the Soviets decided in mid-July to remove Rákosi
from power and replace him with Ernő Gerő, a Stalinist of the first rank. How-
ever, they did accept Tito’s request to posthumously rehabilitate László Rajk,
the former foreign minister who had been condemned to death in 1948, and in
whose honor a solemn funeral was organized in Budapest. This was greeted in
Belgrade as an important sign of de-Stalinization.^53
On 3 September the Soviet leaders reacted to the impetuous ferment in
Poland and Hungary with a confidential letter to members of the CPSU and
to satellite parties, distancing themselves from “national communism” and from
the two documents solemnly signed in 1955 and 1956 with the Yugoslavs, who
were criticized as opportunists because of their “pro-Western” policy. Further,
they stressed that the title “communist-Leninist,” given to Tito by Bulganin
that past June during a toast, was at least premature (Khrushchev even requested
a disciplinary admonition against Bulganin for honoring Tito in such a way).^54
The Yugoslavs were soon informed about the letter and acquired a secret bul-
letin containing Khrushchev’s conversation with Bulgarian top leaders via their
intelligence service. On that occasion, the secretary general of the CPSU
affirmed the need to lure Tito into the socialist camp by all possible means, after
which “we will throttle him.”^55 The Soviet and satellite press began blowing
anti-Yugoslav trumpets again, while in Belgrade the authorities began to pros-
ecute some of the Cominformists who had recently returned home from the