274 The Presidential Years
“camp.” All this failed to thwart the impetuous Khrushchev from making an
unexpected decision: although in the grip of domestic opposition, he announced
his plan for an “informal visit” to Yugoslavia, obviously in order to get Tito’s
support. He still hoped for his return to the fold.^56
The conversations between the two started on 19 September at Brioni and
on the Belje estate, and after eight days continued at Yalta where, in spite of
Kardelj’s objections, Tito went “hunting.” They stayed there until 5 October,
meeting Gerő, the freshly installed Hungarian party leader, who was also vaca-
tioning in Crimea “by chance.” Their long, and at times heated, discussions did
not solve the open questions but brought them closer on a personal level, and
so were not completely fruitless. Tito did not allow himself to be dragged into
the “camp,” but promised to normalize relations with the satellites and to sup-
port the man whom the Soviets wanted in power in Budapest.^57 Consequently,
Ernő Gerő received an official invitation to visit Belgrade in the hope that this
would strengthen his position in Hungary. In mid-October he came to the
Yugoslav capital at a head of a delegation that included János Kádár. Unlike
Gerő who, according to Tito, was unaware of the dramatic situation he was in,
Kádár made a good impression: after the Hungarians left, the marshal told his
colleagues that he appreciated Kádár’s realism and calm.^58
The pilgrimage to visit his former enemy did not help Gerő: on 23 October
1956, a demonstration took place in Budapest, brought about by the events
in Poland, where two days earlier the “Titoist” Gomułka had come to power.^59
At first it seemed that the situation could be kept under control, so on 30
October the Soviet government published a declaration in which it proclaimed
that from that point onward relations with the satellite countries would be
constructed according to new theoretical and practical principles. It recognized
perfect equality with them, stressed the inviolability of their borders, national
independence, sovereignty, and non-interference in their internal affairs, and
even hinted at a withdrawal of troops from Poland, Hungary, and Romania.^60
This move came too late: the Hungarian demonstrations developed into an
uprising that the police and the Red Army, summoned by Gerő, could not
control. The Soviets decided at that point to abandon that apparatchik, so
hated by the people, replacing him with Imre Nagy as president of the govern-
ment and with János Kádár at the head of the party.^61 Furthermore, Anastas
Mikoyan, who hurried from Moscow to Budapest, promised a quick with-
drawal of Soviet troops from Hungary in order to calm enflamed spirits. Tito,
very much preoccupied by the turn of events, sent a letter to the Hungarian
Worker’s Party on 29 October endorsing the new leadership and inviting the
“working people” not to lose faith in socialism, and not to be swayed by “re-
actionary” elements.^62