The Presidential Years 279
military, the UDBA (Uprava državne bezbednosti; the State Security Admin-
istration) began gearing up for enemy occupation, organizing a web of agents
who would stay behind and engage in subversive activity when needed.^82 This
tense atmosphere was mitigated, however, by Tito himself, who on 10 April
publicly asked the press to back off the attacks against the Soviets. This good-
will gesture provoked a new thaw between Moscow and Belgrade, although not
without occasional polemical outbursts. In April, when Enver Hoxha, the mar-
shal’s main foe, visited Moscow, Khrushchev too declared that the polemics
between the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia must end. In May, Pravda dedicated a
few paltry lines to the sudden death of Moša Pijade, but at the end of the
month the Soviet leaders sent Tito their best wishes for his sixty-fifth birth-
day. Meanwhile, the news came that a circular letter had been transmitted to
the satellite parties, inviting them to improve their relations with Yugoslavia
despite their ideological differences. A trip to Moscow by the secretary for
national defense, Ivan Gošnjak, followed, which seemed promising.^83 The thaw
was consolidated in July 1957, when unexpected news came about the fall of
Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, and Dmitrii Shepilov, the “anti-party group”
who had tried to overthrow Khrushchev. The fall from power of personalities
who, in concert with Stalin, had managed anti-Yugoslav policy after 1948, was
greeted in Belgrade with favor. It was clear that Khrushchev’s victory strength-
ened the reformist forces and opened new space for dialogue.^84 This interpreta-
tion was proven correct as early as 16 July, when the Soviets—after a “private”
journey to Crimea undertaken by Kardelj and Ranković—confirmed the prom-
ised loans for the construction of an aluminum plant in Montenegro, which was
to be cofinanced by the GDR. This project had been discussed in 1947 by Kardelj
and Stalin but was never realized because of the 1948 split. The Yugoslavs con-
sidered it very important, certain that it would improve their military industry
and at the same time restore the economy of that underdeveloped republic.^85
Consequently, Tito proposed a secret meeting with Khrushchev on the Dan-
ube in order to resolve, in private, the questions that were still open. But at the
last moment Tito changed his mind, opting instead for a public rendezvous in
Bucharest. On 1 and 2 August the two statesmen, with their colleagues, met at
Snagovo, not far from the Romanian capital, in the former royal castle where
the infamous Cominform Resolution that had expelled Tito from the fold had
been formulated in June 1948. During their exchange of views, the Yugoslavs
claimed that socialism “should step out from the antechamber of Henry VIII,
Ivan the Terrible and the papal Inquisition” stressing, however, their readiness
to better mutual relations. The conversations finished with kisses and hugs.^86
The ambiguous press communiqué, published at the end of the meeting, was
read with interest, especially in Western countries. The Central Intelligence