The Presidential Years 281
in spite of the warnings, did not expect such a reaction. If the Federal Republic
had been put in a similar position by other states, the East Germans would gain
and Bonn would exclude itself from countries that were of great interest.^93 Of
course, it was widely reported internationally and was not without conse-
quences. Tito hoped that his example would be followed by Third World coun-
tries, India above all. Nehru, however, was angry because Tito had misinformed
him as to the true nature of the Hungarian revolt by denying its popular char-
acter, and because he had not been consulted in advance about his intention to
recognize East Germany. Nehru refused to follow Tito’s example and recognize
East Germany, thus initiating a period of cool relations between the two coun-
tries.^94 The United States, for its part, further limited military aid to Belgrade,
openly expressing their disappointment at the marshal’s foreign policy, and
cancelling his official visit to Washington, which had already been planned.
To highlight his independence, Tito decided in December 1957 that from that
moment on he would not accept “gratis” American arms. The following year, at
his request, Washington ceased military although not economic aid, recalling
its military assistance staff—about sixty members—who in recent years had
collaborated with the People’s Army, in spite of occasional disagreements, to
prepare an effective defense against a possible Soviet attack.^95 On the occasion
of his farewell visit to the foreign secretary, Ambassador Riddleberger correctly
noted that “an epoch in Yugoslav-American relations was ending, and a new
one was opening up.”^96
The Moscow ConferenceDespite Tito’s recognition of the GDR, the Soviets did not hold him in much
regard at the time. Only two weeks after the marshal’s decision to ignore the
“Hallstein doctrine,” Khrushchev suddenly rid himself of the legendary Marshal
Georgii Zhukov, the conqueror of Berlin and the Soviet defense minister after
Stalin’s death. He was among Nikita’s main supporters in the struggle for power,
having had a key role in the overthrow of Beria and in the recent demolition of
the “anti-party group.” There was even talk of a “Khrushchev-Zhukov team”
that would dominate the Moscow political scene. This was an eventuality
that the Yugoslavs favored, as they were convinced that Zhukov could control
the unpredictable and wanton Khrushchev who, even at the Bucharest meet-
ing, affirmed that it would have been a “different tune” if Zhukov had sided
with Molotov and Malenkov.^97 Two months later Khrushchev sacked Zhukov
with the accusation of “Bonapartism” even before his return from an official
visit to Yugoslavia and Albania. Tito was offended that Khrushchev had sent
him to the Balkans to prepare favorable ground for Zhukov’s dismissal from