282 The Presidential Years
the party and the army. It was evident that Khrushchev had tried to strengthen
his power by making a fool of him, whereas he, in discussions with his Soviet
colleague, had declared his readiness to share some American military secrets
of which he was aware.^98 Just as this affront was taking place, one hundred
thousand copies of a booklet were published by Enver Hoxha in Moscow,
attacking the “treacherous role” of Yugoslav revisionism. These unforeseen low
blows forced the Yugoslavs to reexamine their foreign policy. Edvard Kardelj,
vice-president of the federal government, was sent to Greece to restore links
with Athens in case of the need to reanimate the Balkan Pact, which had never
been implemented after being signed because of Yugoslavia’s new international
interests, and because of the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus.^99
Three days after the publication of Hoxha’s libelous booklet, on 29 October
1957, Tito suffered a sudden “attack of lumbago” so as to avoid taking part in the
Moscow Conference, which had been organized for the fortieth anniversary
of the “Great October Revolution,” and to which all the communist parties
in the world had been invited.^100 This included the LCY, whose leaders pru-
dently asked in advance how the conference would unfold. “They answered us,”
Kardelj said, “that it would just be a consultation about experiences and forms
of action, and that the eventual final document would stress the need for peace
and coexistence.” But when the draft of this document emerged in October, it
appeared clear that the Soviets wanted to confirm their dogmatic interpre-
tation of socialist solidarity and of the “camp,” headed by the USSR. This was
unacceptable to the Yugoslavs.^101
At the celebrations organized between 3 and 9 November 1957, the Yugoslav
delegation was led not by Tito, but by Kardelj and Ranković, much to Khrush-
chev’s dismay, as he had planned to appear in public with the Yugoslav marshal
and Mao Zedong at his side.^102 He had intended to use the occasion to stage a
“council of communist and workers’ parties of the socialist countries,” so that
after the Hungarian catastrophe the guiding role of the CPSU would be con-
firmed by a common declaration that would support the fundamental princi-
ples of “socialist development” as dictated by the Soviet experience. To this
effect, he tried to convince Kardelj to abandon his reservations about that
document by inviting the Yugoslav delegation to dinner in a Moscow suburb.
On this occasion, a lively discussion flared up, during which Khrushchev
accused the Yugoslavs of being reluctant because of fear of the Americans. “You
need America’s aid, the grain, you have forgotten Marxism,” he said. “You are
drifting away from socialism, if you have not done so already.... We were cer-
tain we had reached an agreement on everything in Bucharest. But now I see
I have blundered. I’m afraid to appear before the Soviet people and the party
and openly confess that I have been hoodwinked by the Yugoslavs.”^103