The Presidential Years 283
According to the other twelve delegations who signed the declaration, the
reason for the Yugoslav refusal must be found in their evaluation of forces in
the world, which was foreign to Marxism-Leninism, and their underestimation
of the imperialist threat, especially the American one. The Yugoslav position,
according to which the existence of two military blocs was responsible for in-
ternational tensions, was not acceptable, since the Warsaw Pact safeguarded the
successes of socialism and should be seen as a fundamental factor in the mainte-
nance of peace. By contrast, NATO was a tool for stirring up imperialist con-
flicts. It was clear, they affirmed, that the Yugoslav “comrades,” in evaluating the
global situation, did not start from class positions. Their view of peaceful coex-
istence was far from a Leninist conception, since they did not take into account
the need for ideological engagement. The Yugoslavs believed that the socialist
forces in the world were strong and, therefore, did not have to be organized in
order to triumph. This meant that they focused on the spontaneous workers’
movement, opposing the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of a coordinated struggle.
In short, they wanted to sit on two chairs at the same time, renouncing in prac-
tice or, more accurately, harming the most powerful weapon the proletariat had
at its disposal.^104
The Yugoslavs, together with the delegates of the other sixty-three com-
munist and worker’s parties present in Moscow, signed a Peace Manifesto on
19 November, although this did not calm the Soviets. On that occasion, Kardelj
gave a speech that was warmly accepted by all but which did not change Khrush-
chev’s hostility toward him. This attitude provoked the Slovene so much that
he collapsed on his way back, when he was near Bucharest.^105 He returned from
Moscow utterly upset, but determined to elaborate his political thought further.
The Ninth Plenum, convened on 7 December 1957 at Brioni, also supported
him in this. The participants unanimously approved the behavior of their del-
egation to Moscow, though stressing that the difference of opinions should not
hinder “fraternal collaboration” between communist parties and states. But this
was easier said than done.^106
The Trbovlje StrikeMeanwhile, other storm clouds appeared on the horizon. It was not possible to
ignore the ethnic conflict beginning to reappear among Croats and Serbs. In
Croatia, the term “Serbo-communism” circulated, which expressed the popular
opinion that the Serbs had reaped the greatest advantages from the regime.
At the same time, the Serbs, Montenegrins, Bosniaks, and Macedonians felt
discriminated against, as their standard of living was lower than that of the
Croats or Slovenes. Even in influential party and intellectual circles, there were
complaints about the privileges enjoyed by Slovenia and Croatia because of