The Presidential Years 297
These problems were not addressed openly, since the slogan about “brother-
hood and unity” was still paramount. Nobody dared to say that self-management
was not implemented according to official propaganda, given that the workers
did not have the role in the factories guaranteed them by law. Because of the
workers’ scarce or nonexistent managerial skills, the last word mostly fell to
factory managers, whose appointments had more to do with their party affilia-
tion than their competence.^174 For years, Tito and his comrades had ignored
the contradictions and shortcomings of their regime, lulling themselves into
the conviction that it was the best in the world. At the Second Plenum, on 18
and 19 November 1959, they asserted enthusiastically: “Our development is
growing three or four times as fast as that of the most advanced Eastern coun-
tries... and it is faster than that of the Western Countries.” In his final speech,
Tito reiterated that “the whole world speaks today about Yugoslavia’s successes
regarding industrialization and agriculture.... It is essential to keep the pres-
tige we have achieved, and to show the correctness of our path to socialism.”^175
It was soon clear, however, that the situation was not so rosy. The dissatisfaction
of the population, especially of those who were younger and more intellectu-
ally aware, smoldered under the surface, reappearing openly only a year after
Trbovlje, in mid-May 1959, during a protest organized by students in Zagreb.
It started at noon in the university canteen as a reaction to the bad food: the
students began to trash the room and then spilled out into the street, heading
toward the city center. They raised banners with sarcastic slogans: Long live
Tito—we need bread! Long live Bakarić—we are hungry! The demonstration,
joined by some thousand people, was blocked by the UDBA and the police,
who managed to divert it onto side streets, preventing the crowd from reaching
the main square in front of the National Theater. Some ninety people were
injured and there was one fatality. Many protesters were arrested and driven
away in trucks. Calm was restored only at 5 p.m. The following day, Zagreb
newspapers scarcely mentioned the incident, whereas the Belgrade papers
ignored it altogether. The mini-revolt preoccupied the leadership, who were not
used to street protests, and prompted them to immediately improve the eco-
nomic conditions of the students by offering them grants, although they were
ready to use the force if necessary.^176 When, during a session of the University
Committee, the political organization of that institution, Vladimir Bakarić,
Croatia’s strongman, was asked how to calm down the youth, he answered:
“Easy, we will compel them to disband with fire hoses.” And when he heard the
reply: “What if they will not relent?” he cynically retorted, as if it were com-
pletely normal: “Then with tanks.”^177
Along with the disappointment of the young, who grew ever more estranged
from the party, and of the working masses, there was also the dissatisfaction of