310 The Presidential Years
regarding the suitable attitude to assume toward the Soviets appeared in the
mid-fifties. Kardelj and his circle thought that Tito was under the spell of the
Muscovite sirens, and therefore they instructed Slovenia’s former UDBA chief,
Matija Maček, Tito’s friend, to call on him to be more cautious. When Tito
arrived at Brdo Castle for a vacation, Maček—an iron-fisted man who mis-
trusted Russians—performed this delicate task. A heated discussion followed,
which according to Maček nevertheless ended on a promising note.^238
During the Yugoslav delegation’s journey to the Soviet Union in June 1956,
Kardelj reaffirmed his discontent over the renewal of relations between the
LCY and the CPSU sponsored by the marshal. He shared Koča Popović’s
opinion that the Moscow Declaration (between parties) derogated the positive
principles of the earlier Belgrade Declaration, which dealt with the relations
between states. He was also convinced that the unrepentant Stalinists prevailed
in the Soviet Union, especially regarding internal policy, administration, and
the security services.^239 Even the Western diplomats noticed that something
was wrong, observing how neglected Slovenia was on important occasions. It
was noticeable, for instance, that Kardelj was systematically relegated to the
background in the edited photomontages of the most important leaders pub-
lished by the press, and that in common sessions of the two parties, or during
ceremonies, protocol assigned him a makeshift role. It was not just a case of
discrimination in terms of protocol, but also of disagreements that were prob-
ably quite cutting if it is true that in the summer of 1956 Tito suggested to
Ranković that they “liquidate” Kardelj, since he could no longer bear his pro-
tests regarding relations with the Soviets. After his return from Moscow at the
beginning of August, Tito invited the UDBA chief to a dinner at Oplonac, a
Karadjordjević estate where the marshal had not been for a long time. During
a walk in the woods, he confessed that it was not possible to collaborate with
Kardelj any longer: “He defies me at every step. He does not discuss anything
with me. Pepca [Kardelj’s wife] plots against me and Jovanka. Let’s convene a
plenum of the CC. Out of the party, either me or him!”^240
Although he shared Tito’s critical attitude, Ranković thought that the “liq-
uidation” of Kardelj could be harmful, believing that they should not give too
much importance to stances that could not damage the marshal’s authority. He
noted, moreover, that the Djilas case was still fresh, and that new friction at the
top could have negative repercussions in both country and party. This annoyed
the marshal, who decided to skip the dinner. “We drank our coffee and returned
to Belgrade,” wrote Dobrica Ćosić, quoting Ranković.^241 In his memoirs the
latter tells more or less the same story, except the conclusion, where he asserted:
“He told me then, for the first time, that Kardelj was an incorrigible nationalist,
and that he would create a lot of trouble. In the end, he accepted my proposal