The Presidential Years 315
bringing order to the state apparatus, reinforcing the role of the party in pub-
lic life, strengthening the ideological struggle and opposing liberal tendencies,
especially regarding investments, which reformers thought should not only
solve social problems in underdeveloped areas, but also generate profits. His
opponents naturally tried to defend themselves, starting with Kardelj, who
reiterated his opinion: the experiment carried out to date was important not
just for the Yugoslav people. Every surrender of self-management would
jeopardize “the fundamental problem of socialist development in the world,”
and would be an acknowledgement that “there is no exit from the Stalinist
dead end.”^261
Since they were well aware of how important this discussion was, Ranković
and his minions decided to record it secretly in order to use it at the moment
of Tito’s succession to show how much the “liberals” had strayed from his path.
The tapes should be used—or at least this was the conviction of Stane Kavčič
and Miko Tripalo, two rising stars in Slovenia and Croatia—to block those
who opposed the seizure of power by “Comrade Marko,” a.k.a. Ranković a.k.a.
Leka.^262 In this murky atmosphere, the Executive Committee of the LCY de-
cided to ask all the republican leaders to take a stand on the questions under
discussion and to inform the top-level politicians about their opinions in writ-
ing. Since they could count on the support of the majority (Vladimir Bakarić
and the Croatian CP prudently kept silent), Tito and Ranković wanted to
remove Kardelj from public life with this maneuver, or at least diminish his
influence by shunting self-management to the sidelines. They did not take into
account the support Kardelj enjoyed in Slovenia, where his “clan” dominated
the scene and where he had the approval of public opinion in its fight against
Belgrade centralism.^263
The session of the CC of the Slovenian CP, organized on 29 and 30 March
1962, consequently condemned every attempt at centralizing. The Slovenian
politicians, although well aware of the risks they were taking, did not hide their
conviction that the “Old One has not been in the know about what was going
on in the country for five years,” suggesting that he was not able to govern any-
more.^264 Tito’s and Ranković’s reaction to this challenge was swift: on 3 April
they convened a new session of the Executive Committee in Belgrade, where
Kardelj, frightened by the radicalism of his fellow Slovenes, accused them of
having worsened his position. The Slovenians, headed by old Maček and young
Kavčič, stressed that there were questions of capital importance at stake on
which it was not possible to yield.^265 The following discussion did not bring
clarification or an explicit victory to either side, although the conservatives came
out ahead. During the debate, Kardelj remained isolated and exposed to Tito’s
and Gošnjak’s criticisms. He was so upset that he was unable to reply: he kept