The Presidential Years 327
Ranković’s FallIn September 1965, Vladimir Bakarić was back on the political scene after a
long sick leave. With Kardelj, who admired him “for his deep theoretical spirit”
and for his “highly developed political sense” he visited a Zagreb expo fair,
the country’s most important. As both were interested in creating a modern
and democratic state, naturally within the limits of the socialist regime, they
had a series of discussions that led to the subsequent fall of Ranković.^327 In the
context of this reform policy, and also with the conviction that Western aid
would disappear if the Yugoslav economy did not recover, Kardelj openly ana-
lyzed the contemporary problems of society, proposing a radical transforma-
tion. To everyone’s surprise, at the session of the Executive Committee of the
LCY on 12 and 13 November 1965 he resumed speaking about Yugoslavia in a
way that could be considered bold and unprejudiced: “After all, I will tell you,
comrades, that we are not united because of Yugoslavia, but because of social-
ism. And if we will not understand that it is socialism that unites Yugoslavia,
nothing else can unite it.”^328 According to Kardelj, three different political cur-
rents existed in the country: the Slovenian and Croat, which was interested
in ample autonomy for the republics; the centralist, represented by the under-
developed republics; and the hegemonic, especially strong in Serbia. The latter
was the most authoritative and was the most likely to prevail when the old
leaders eventually disappeared. In order to prevent this danger it was necessary
to transform the state, as far as possible, into a forum where the different repub-
lics could coordi nate their interests. Although this idea foresaw two guard-
ians of the socialist order, the LCY and the army, it appeared too daring to the
party leaders, as it assigned to the state only the function of a “technical instru-
ment”—as in a confederation—appointed to mediate between the parties. As
a result it was not developed further, which does not mean that Kardelj aban-
doned the idea.^329
These problems remained unresolved, increasing the fracture between the
“liberals” and the “conservatives” who, according to a CIA informant, did every-
thing possible to boycott the reform.^330 The resistance was spearheaded by
Ranković, who Kardelj respected for his contributions as one of the most
prominent leaders of the party and its secret services and for the firmness of his
thought and his organizational capacities. However, at the moment when new
social and political rules needed to be established in the country, Ranković
became a liability because of two traits of his character: “The inclination to
overrate coercive means and the use of state discipline, which led the LCY down
the path of centralism, of coteries, of pragmatic decisions without any sensitiv-
ity toward national issues.”^331 For these reasons, Ranković had to be removed.