The Presidential Years 331
Ranković only became aware of the mess he was in during the Executive
Committee session, to which he had been invited just an hour before. While
his colleagues had been informed in detail about the matter under discussion,
he had been kept in dark.^358 On that occasion, Tito announced that the UDBA
had also spied on Kardelj and other leaders, stressing that a similar police sys-
tem “has in the past cost the Soviet Union 15 million lives,” referring to the
Stalinist terror.^359 (He forgot to say that on different occasions he had been
the one to give the order to install bugs in his residence, and in those of his
comrades, and that Kardelj had done the same in his office).^360 The members
of the Executive Committee, Ranković included, agreed that such methods
should stop, although Ranković expressed doubts about the veracity of the
accusations. In response, Tito proposed the formation of a commission, headed
by the Macedonian Krste Crvenkovski, charged with an overview of the secu-
rity department and its methods. In order to be as authoritative as possible, it
was composed of six members, one for each republic. At the same time, he
suggested the creation of another “technical” commission, which in fact already
existed, though he wished to grant it official status.^361 Ranković offered to
resign from all his posts, stressing that he felt responsible for the UDBA’s activ-
ity. Although the session was short, he returned home worn out, perfectly con-
scious that he was the victim of a plot. To his wife, who came to meet him,
he said: “It’s all over because of some stupid interceptions” (a euphemism for
bugging), adding under his breath: “If they even existed.”^362
The party and state commission finished its work on 20 June 1966, sub-
mitting the results to the Executive Committee. It was not considered appro-
priate to query Ranković, even though he had asked Crvenkovski to allow his
voice to be heard. Crvenkovski was asked not to interrogate Ranković, since
the marshal wanted to speak to him personally. Those who were interviewed
were at first cleverly reticent, it being obvious—as Miko Tripalo, one of the
members of the commission, said—that “amateurs,” as he and his colleagues
were, could not cope with professional policemen.^363 Initially, they all tried to
defend Ranković and Stefanović (Ćeća), the UDBA chief, later deciding to
sacrifice the latter to save “Comrade Marko.” It was only when a safe was found
at the Department of Foreign Affairs containing files with intelligence reports
about numerous ambassadors and secretaries of state, which were filled with
Ranković’s and Stefanović’s notes, did the first confessions started to pour in.
Tripalo wrote: “Something was clear pretty soon. The security service had a
powerful position in society and depended on a small group of officials. It
would be difficult to say that Ranković was preparing a coup against Tito,
nearer to the truth was that he was getting ready to succeed Tito smoothly
when he died.”^364