338 The Presidential Years
took part in two meetings of the Warsaw Pact, in Moscow and Budapest.
During these meetings he agreed with Soviet policy in the Middle East, and
on his own initiative broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, the creation of
which he had supported twenty years before.^404 This decision, arbitrary and
contrary to the sympathies of public opinion, caused an outcry: ten of the most
important party members met confidentially and agreed that Tito could not
remain head of state if he continued to maintain friendly connections with the
Soviet Union, since such a policy was harmful to the interests of the country.
Kardelj, Bakarić, and Koča Popović called for his resignation and only General
Gošnjak defended him.^405 Among the party nomenklatura it was openly said
that “the Old One did not understand the contemporary situation,” that he
had “a persecution complex” and did not know “what he was saying and
doing.”^406 Tito, of course, did not allow himself to be intimidated: he threat-
ened to address the Federal Assembly if the “comrades” criticized him further,
well aware that in such a case he would have the upper hand because of his
charisma and authority.^407
Beyond this dramatic discussion, the Seventh Plenum buried the ambitions
of those who had wanted to overhaul the party, forcing them to recognize Tito’s
continued guiding role. “Democratic centralism,” said Mijalko Todorović, one
of the spokespersons of the reformers, “is subject to new conditions but is still
the valid, fundamental principle of every coordinated activity.”^408 “It seems evi-
dent,” noted the highly orthodox East German ambassador, Eleonore Staimer,
with satisfaction, “that Todorović and his allies have not been able to impose
the liberal line.... As regards the internal problems of the SFRY, the plenum
has shown that the positive forces, with Tito at their head, are still capable of
asserting themselves.”^409 The first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Belgrade
added in August 1967 that the expression “the reorganization of the LCY ”
promised much more than was carried out. Regarding the basic questions of
democratic centralism, the role of the working class and of the class struggle,
“healthy opinions” had prevailed.^410
This defeat did not prevent Todorović and his group from continuing to
criticize Tito’s autocracy, forcing him into a complex set of political maneuvers.
As a Croat and in order not to be accused by the Serbs of a coup d’état because
of Ranković’s removal, the marshal assumed a compliant attitude toward them.
In the following years, Serbia received, 80 percent of all state investments (the
new Djerdap Dam, the Belgrade-Bar railroad line, infrastructure in the capi-
tal), in addition to important political functions. Even so, Tito was not able to
capture the sympathies of the liberal-inspired Serb leaders who had recently
come to power with these concessions. They were convinced they were dealing
with a dogmatic Bolshevik, an autocrat who was ready to do business with the