The Presidential Years 353
3 million citizens against the enemy.^488 In short, at that time no European
country was as actively involved in the preparation for national defense as was
Yugoslavia, where even kindergarten children were taught to reach air-raid
shelters. Military expenses rose steeply, reaching 5–6 percent of the annual
GNP, since the government believed that it had as much to fear from its East-
ern “big brother” as from NATO.^489
In August 1968, when fear of a Soviet attack was at its peak, the top Yugoslav
leaders met secretly on the islet of Vanga, Tito’s private Brioni refuge. On
that occasion, General Ivan Gošnjak, secretary of defense, was heavily criti-
cized for his pro-Soviet attitude and accused of being ready to “open the
frontiers to the Warsaw Pact troops.”^490 After this session, Kardelj returned
to Ljubljana and with great satisfaction announced to the local political elite
that the idea of the “people in arms” had prevailed and that, in case of war, the
resistance would not only be carried out by the regular army, but also by Parti-
san units organized autonomously in each republic. According to the testimony
of his son, Matija Maček, the “iron man” of the local secret services, was so
happy that he hopped around like a child. The Slovenes were elated, since they
had not yet overcome the shock experienced in 1945 when Tito had compelled
their own Partisan forces to join the Yugoslav People’s Army ( Jugoslovanska
ljudska armija). The territorial defense plan was greeted with satisfaction in
Slovenia and in Croatia: it offered them the chance to build their republican
armed forces alongside the standing army that was controlled mostly by the
Serbs.^491
By contrast, the institution of the territorial defense was disliked by many
military leaders, starting with Ivan Gošnjak, who raised doubts about its effi-
cacy and was convinced that it would undermine the prestige of the Yugoslav
National Army.^492 After Ranković’s fall, it seemed that Gošnjak had reached
the peak of his power and influence. He had an excellent working relationship
with Tito, especially in opposing self-management in the armed forces, which
Kardelj would have liked. But not a year passed before the rug was pulled out
from under him: he was often criticized for appointing only likeable officers,
often without the approval of the Executive Committee.^493 Gošnjak interpreted
the nationalistic outburst after the Fourth Plenum as a consequence of Tito’s
refusal to follow his advice to completely renew the country’s leadership and
get rid of “historical cadres,” which he saw as Tito’s fatal mistake. The marshal,
who was aware of these criticisms, was offended. Consequently, their relations
rapidly deteriorated so much as to induce Gošnjak to use insulting epithets—
“that dog” for instance—when speaking about Tito.^494 Although he remained
deputy commander in chief, in June 1967 he was replaced as National Defense
Secretary by the Serb Nikola Ljubičić who, in addition to having saved Tito at