The Presidential Years 359
continued to develop, the operation was successful, creating an atmosphere
of mutual confidence that went beyond the personal sympathy between Tito
and Brandt. In contrast with Konrad Adenauer, long-time chancellor of West
Germany, who considered Tito “a common bandit,”^521 the new foreign minister
thought that the marshal, despite his feudal way of life, was worthy of much
respect because of his political rebelliousness against Hitler and Stalin as well as
his efforts to create a new Yugoslavia, which was “in the interest of the Medi-
terranean.” He valued his foreign policy even more since, according to Brandt,
it had a positive influence, not only on the Third World, but also on the neutral
countries of Europe.^522 Herbert Wehner, a leading West German politician who
had known Broz from the time of the Hotel Lux and was grateful to him for a
friendly gesture in those difficult times, said at a banquet organized in honor of
a Yugoslav delegation in 1971: “We agree on so many points that it is better not
to mention them, so that we and you will not be harmed. You will not find a
better and a more careful observer of your path than we social-democrats on
this side of divided Germany.”^523 In this atmosphere the Soviet Union pro-
posed the organization of a conference on security; cooperation in Europe was
discussed, which, according to Tito and Brandt, should not result in a confron-
tation between the two blocs, but offer a chance to assert their positions to each
other and to neutral and non-aligned countries.^524
The summer of 1969 saw the “motorway affair” blow up in Slovenia: the
Ljubljana government found the courage to oppose the federal government.
The Slovenian population had long been in turmoil as a result of their unsatis-
factory condition: they wanted a better lifestyle, which the reforms were unable
to guarantee, and more political freedom, which the self-government policy
had promised but not delivered. The Ljubljana government planned a motor-
way running from the Austrian border to Gorizia in Italy, aiming to link Slo-
venia with Central and Western Europe and boost its economy. In advocating
their proposal, the Slovenians pointed out that more than 94 percent of the
tourist traffic passed through their republic but, in spite of this, they received
from the federal fund just three-quarters of a percent of the funds available
during the period of 1956–69. The financing of the motorway seemed resolved:
the necessary means would be provided partially by the republic itself, par-
tially by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a UN
agency.^525 Ljubljana’s indignation was unrestrained when the news suddenly
came at the end of July that the federal government, headed by Mitja Ribičič, a
Slovenian, had channeled the funds already granted into Serbian road projects
of secondary economic importance. Following the principle that something
should be given to every republic (Slovenia had already received an allocation
for a section of the motorway), this decision was made after the World Bank