The Presidential Years 365
president of the CC of the Serb CP, competent and able, but arrogant, sum-
marized this conviction with the formula of “clear agreements,” asking that
every republic be able to cover its own bills independently. This was a bold
move, since it meant that Serbia renounced its position as the embryonic cell of
the country, settling for the status of just one the federal state entities.^555
D-day for the renewal was to be 17 April 1971, the last day of Tito’s presi-
dency of the SFRY. Based on his speech in Zagreb in September of the pre-
vious year, it seemed he was ready to accept the title of “honorary president,”
delegating his authority and duties to a collective presidency manned by rep-
resentatives of the republics. It was evident, as recorded in a CIA document,
that Yugoslav leaders wanted to insert the procedure for his succession into the
constitutional norms to avoid any chaos at the moment of Tito’s departure
from the political scene. On 13 February 1971, Edvard Kardelj, head of the coor-
dination commission for the reform, published a press release declaring that
this could not be implemented, because the time was not yet ripe. He made it
clear that the Yugoslav leaders would not tolerate any diminution of central
power, which was also confirmed by the Federal Assembly’s decision to extend
Tito’s presidential mandate until the end of August. It was widely believed in
the upper echelon that it was not sensible to allow free reign at a moment when
Croatia and Serbia were in a state of agitation.^556
The Ustaša MigrationMeanwhile, Yugoslavia was in turmoil over a plot against the Croat leaders, who
were accused of being traitors and collaborators of the Ustaša organizations in
West Germany and elsewhere. Until the mid-sixties these opposition groups had
not played a significant role, remaining fairly isolated. Things changed drastically
when the Yugoslav authorities opened the borders with the 1965 reform and
allowed workers to find jobs abroad. The majority of these workers went to the
BRD (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, or West Germany) where, in 1970, there
were already about half a million immigrant workers. There they came into con-
tact with political refugees, of whom at least six thousand were involved in Chet-
nik and even more belligerent Ustaša groups. Under the slogan “Independent
Croatia,” these émigré goups promoted a fiery proselytism, trying to bring the
compatriots who had come to Germany for economic reasons into their orbit.
This worried the Belgrade authorities, especially at the end of the sixties and
beginning of the seventies, when the Ustaše increased their terrorist activities.
Since the protest to the Bonn government had little effect, the UDBA started
to infiltrate these groups, so much so that it was aware of 90 percent of their
plans. It was also implicated in the “liquidations” of those who caused too much
trouble.^557