The Presidential Years 367
discovered a list of 450 Serb individuals in Croatia whom the local nationalists
intended to liquidate.^562
To clear the air, Tito convened the plenum of the enlarged presidency of the
LCY from 28 to 30 April 1971, the seventeenth since its foundation, which was
to prove tumultuous. During a preliminary conversation with Tripalo, the mar-
shal said that the situation was extremely serious, that there was danger of a
counterrevolution, and that he would not behave as had Dubček, the ill-fated
leader of the Prague Spring, but would restore order with the army if neces-
sary.^563 During the session, the Croats were forced to listen to numerous re-
proaches because of their tolerant attitude toward “chauvinist elements,” as
were the Serbs, because of their reservations regarding the constitutional
amendments. The most dramatic moment came when an assistant approached
Tito and whispered something in his ear. Unusually for him, the marshal inter-
rupted the discussion and left the room. When he returned, he informed the
puzzled gathering that he had received a call from Brezhnev, who wanted to be
informed about what was going on, and who was ready to offer his “fraternal”
assistance.^564 Tito assured the participants in the meeting that he rejected such
proposals, stressing that the problems would be resolved by the Yugoslav party
itself. His words were met, however, by a hostile silence and interpreted as a
tactical move designed to put pressure on the plenum so that it would give in
to his will.^565
In any case, perhaps even thanks to this episode, a compromise was reached.
In the final statement, which was full of the usual, sometimes abstruse rhetoric,
one thing was clear: that “foreign subversive elements” had tried to exploit the
difficulties of Yugoslavia by relying on “internal enemies of the country.” The
attempt to discredit the Croat leadership was part of this plan, but no organs
of the federal administration were involved. In short, it seemed that the Croats
and the Serbs were both satisfied.^566 Before the final session Tito confessed that
he was mostly in agreement with the Croats. After having listened to their
laments about how Croatia was discriminated against, he rose from his arm-
chair, visibly shaken, and hand on heart said with a grave voice: “Here I feel that
you are right. But you are lacking political wisdom.”^567
Vladimir Bakarić, who was often compared to the Buddha because of his
inscrutable behavior, also understood at the time that Savka Dabčević-Kučar,
Miko Tripalo, and their collaborators lacked “political wisdom.” At the end of
April 1971, maybe even before, he had begun to distance himself from them,
aware that his younger colleagues were unable to cope with this Croat national-
ism, which would burn itself out. Later, in a private meeting, Tito observed that
“Bakarić was not used to engaging in battles already lost.” He was, as Kardelj
also recognized, an insuperable master in assessing the political situation. (And