368 The Presidential Years
he probably knew that Savka Dabčević-Kučar and her group had been con-
trolled by the KOS for the last two years).^568 During a tour in Croatia, Bakarić
began pouring oil onto the troubled waters, stressing that the adjective “national”
should not be used for the Croat republic, and in this way recognizing the
rights of the large and powerful Serb minority in the republic. In the provincial
town of Tounj, he assumed an openly critical attitude toward the ruling trio in
Zagreb (Savka Dabčević-Kučar, Miko Tripalo, and Pero Pirker) for the first
time. He was severely reprimanded and compelled to defend himself for being
too indulgent toward the advocates of recentralization.^569
The Start of the Showdown
At the second Self-Management Congress, held in Sarajevo between 5 and 8
May 1971, Kardelj played the lead role. It appeared clear that Croatia could expect
hard times ahead. In his introduction, the Slovene admonished the republics
not to use the autonomy granted to them by the constitutional amendments to
favor local chauvinist tendencies. He too, like Bakarić, had distanced himself
from the Croat “young guard.” Savka Dabčević-Kučar, seated in the first row,
did not join the general applause that greeted this assertion. She was still
shocked by a discussion with Kardelj in Ljubljana in April when he told her
clearly: “I would prefer to see Russian tanks in the streets rather than anything
that would endanger the achievements of the revolution, because of your policy
à la Dubček.”^570 He took for granted that every step toward mass democracy in
Yugoslavia would necessarily bring “the victory of the counterrevolution.”^571
During the Sarajevo congress, it was not only the Croats who stood indicted,
but also the Serbs. In Belgrade, opposition to the constitutional amendments
was growing, as was a hostile attitude toward Tito. His critics affirmed that,
at a moment when ample autonomy was offered to the republics and the two
provinces, “our main task is to defend the rights of the Serb people, a large por-
tion of whom [about 40 percent] live outside Serbia.” This foreshadowed the
destruction of Yugoslavia. A university professor even dared to declare that
Tito should not run for the presidency of the federation again.^572 In addition,
Mijalko Todorović, one of the most prominent members of the Serb political
elite, said during a stay at the Yugoslav embassy in Moscow: “Tito is growing
old. He will not last for long.” Those words were immediately transmitted to
the marshal, who reacted furiously.^573 Brezhnev, who had a specific channel of
communication with Tito, admonished him to watch out for the Croats, who
wanted to separate from Yugoslavia, but even more to watch out for the Serbs
and the Bosnians, who wanted to overthrow him.^574
It was significant for the political climate of the moment that in his speech
at the Sarajevo congress, Tito had attacked “some retired generals,” accusing