The Presidential Years 379
Croat people.” They called for a seat at the United Nations and a representative
at the World Bank to enter into direct discussions for a new loan. They also
stressed the need to create a national bank and an autonomous army but, above
all, to keep hard currency earned in Croatia in its own coffers.^630 “They behave
like a monkey in the jungle,” remarked Miroslav Krleža. “They went up to the
top of the tree and are shouting so much that they do not realize how the fire
licks their asses.”^631 Tito was informed of these requests during his journey in
the United States. He was outraged, convinced that the Croat leaders should
have been able to control what was going on.^632
The students sent telegrams both to him and to the Croat leaders, assuring
their loyalty without dispelling the suspicion that the strike was a counterrevo-
lutionary action steered from abroad. It was not clear by whom: some pointed to
the Ustaše émigrés, others to the Belgrade secret services who were committed
to compromising the Croat leadership. The latter distanced itself from the stu-
dents, while at the same time declaring that it understood the “impatience of
the young.”^633 Attempts by Savka Dabčević-Kučar and her colleagues to con-
vince the protesters to keep calm fell on deaf ears, which gave the impression
that this was a maneuver to mask their intention to use the demonstrations for
their own ends. The decision of the Croat League of Communists to interrupt
relations with the party organs at the federal level confirmed these suspicions.^634
Although the student movement did not have significant dimensions, and it
had already started to die down by the end of the month, Tito used the oppor-
tunity to get rid of the Croat liberals. In Belgrade it was whispered that he
decided on this after having been advised that “Savka Dabčević-Kučar and
Miko Tripelo” wanted to depose him.^635 At the end of November he inter-
rupted a trip to Romania and returned home in haste, probably encouraged
by a meeting with General Ljubičić, who informed him that the members of
the Veteran’s League, not just in Serbia, but also in Croatia and in other repub-
lics, were troubled because of his indecision. He made it clear that Tito’s role
as chief of state and of the army was in danger: “Either you, or them,” said
Ljubičić.^636 In response to this open threat, Tito convoked an emergency ses-
sion, inviting “the Croat comrades” to Karadjordjevo, his cherished hunting
lodge. He had a long discussion with the delegation on 30 November, which
lasted twenty consecutive hours. This was unusual for him, since he did not like
long meetings. The confrontation did not escalate dramatically, but the tension
was underlined by the armed guards who surrounded the building. According
to Tito, there were only a few hundred chauvinists in Croatia, but they had
managed to create a mass movement, which was intolerable. Evidently there
was too much democracy in the republic: “I have always said that there is no
democracy for the class enemy.”^637