394 The Later Years
Union—although hostile to self-management and non-alignment—would tol-
erate the Yugoslav path to socialism as long as it was interested in mitigating
the tensions in a divided Europe.^7 It was therefore necessary to take advantage
of the propitious moment and to promulgate the new constitution as quickly
as possible, to guarantee the establishment of the most progressive and just
society in the world, rather than the “technocratic bureaucracy” of the Stalinist
brand. Such a society, he believed, could not be easily demolished, even in the
event of a grave internal or international crisis. It is a pity, however, as Savka
Dabčević-Kučar said, that Kardelj “fought for a democracy whose origin, aim
and criterion was his and his alone.”^8 He believed that the popular masses
should not be trusted but should be led and directed from above.
Kardelj did everything possible to explain to citizens the aims and substance
of the constitution as well as the new concepts he was introducing into the
political lexicon. He appeared at least eight times on TV, offering long explana-
tory accounts (although they were not very successful because of his verbosity).
As the Czechoslovak ambassador in Belgrade noted, “Kardelj was not loved by
the working class, since his theories were too sophisticated and obscure.”^9 “If he
had not been so intolerably long-winded in his speeches and writings,” states a
profile prepared by the British Embassy on the leading personalities in Yugo-
slavia, “he might well have been recognized as a political theoretician of major
international standing.”^10
Tito viewed Kardelj’s “theories” with skepticism, especially as he feared that
they “would ruin the economy,” as he said at the Second Congress of Self-
Managers in Sarajevo in 1971.^11 Burdened by the struggles and dramatic events
of the previous years, he resigned himself to accepting the new constitution,
although not without another clash with Kardelj that definitively ruined their
relations.^12 Tito was aging and at this stage he was much more interested in
concentrating on his role as a world statesman than on the issues at home.
According to Josip Kopinič, he was active and responsible for his deeds until
the mid-sixties. From that time on, he progressively lost control of the domes-
tic situation, allowing Kardelj and Bakarić to shape policy.^13 Before giving his
blessing to the constitution, he asserted that the text must include a series of
guarantees that would preserve the regime’s fundamental characteristics as he
had formulated them. He demanded, first of all, that the role of the party and the
army should be precisely defined as guarantors of the independence of the coun-
try, and that he would attain the presidency for life, for which Kardelj promised
to assure his support. Thus Tito’s power became absolute from a formal point
of view as well. Kardelj tried to excuse himself: “I know that the proclamation
of a life president cannot be a point of honor for a democratic country, but I
had to do it to make this work. In the past, the most important officials were