The Later Years 407
“Asiatic” mentality. He was wrong, however, to speak of “our” policy; this was
actually Tito’s own personal policy, as over the years he had become increasingly
prone to identify Yugoslavia with himself and to be easily swayed by adulation.
During the Fourth Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers in 1975, Jean-Bedel
Bokassa, the ruler of the Central African Republic, addressed him thus: “Mis-
ter President—what Alexander the Great, Caesar, Napoleon and Wilhelm II
were unable to achieve, to unite the majority of humanity with force of arms,
you have achieved with the force of ideas. You have united small and mid-sized
states of the contemporary world, representing two-thirds of humanity, and
with reason proclaiming themselves its conscience.”^75
It is clear that, after such compliments, the relations between Yugoslavia
and the Central African Republic (later Empire) were marked by a maximum of
cordiality. Foreign Secretary Miko Tepavac, already weakened by the fall of his
liberal friends and confronted with a policy he could not agree with, decided he
could not stay in office. On 1 November 1972 he resigned and was replaced by
Miloš Minić, known for his conservative ideas. Minić had been in disgrace for
some time, but at the moment he was considered “Tito’s man,” given that he
favored close collaboration with Moscow. The price for the recovered friendship
with the Soviets was paid by the “Praxis” group of philosophers, including illus-
trious professors from the Universities of Belgrade and Ljubljana. Because of the
influence these “Trotskyists” exercised on intellectual and student circles, they
were removed from their chairs and their magazine was closed. “Yugoslavia,” said
the vice-president of the federal Presidium, speaking with the Czech oslovak
defense minister, Martin Dzúr, “feels part of the socialist world. In case of ten-
sions, it will fight with it against imperialists.”^76 In the name of such friendly
relations, or even an informal alliance, Tito allowed the Soviets, at the beginning
of 1974, to use the Dalmatian ports for the repair of their fleet: an important
concession considering the increasing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean.
The Cominformist EmigrationJust at the moment when it seemed that there were no stumbling blocks be-
tween Moscow and Belgrade—although economic collaboration still needed
improvement—an unexpected incident happened that was connected to the
Cominform emigration (those who followed Stalin rather than Tito when the
two split in 1948). After the exclusion of the CPY, the Cominform had devel-
oped virulent propaganda against Tito with the help of the press and radio
stations broadcasting from the socialist countries and the Soviet Union.^77 It also
sponsored espionage and armed groups that continually provoked incidents on
the frontier, trying to sabotage production and to destabilize Yugoslavian soci-
ety. The Soviet military authorities even created an air force in the Urals region