412 The Later Years
newspapers affirming that the Red Army had liberated all of East and Central
Europe between 1944 and 1945, Yugoslavia included, thus contributing to the
affirmation of socialism in the area. According to them, Tito’s Partisans had
a marginal role in the war effort against the “Fascists.”^97 As if this were not
enough, the Bulgarians adopted the stance that the CPY had reached power in
a similar way to other East European parties, thanks to Soviet troops, as they
were ready to exalt in their media the contribution of their own army to the
liberation of Serbia in autumn 1944.
This affront to the liberation struggle, which indirectly denied the impor-
tance of the Yugoslav revolution and the legitimacy of the CPY, was the subject
of furious commentary by Tito on 2 April in Skopje and the following day in
Kosovo. Later he spoke about it, although less violently, in a long TV interview
in which he presented his version of the Second World War in the Balkans.^98
With this he opened the dam to a flood of declarations by veterans’ associa-
tions, who did not tire of repeating his words: “We have allied with the Soviet
Union from the very beginning. I would like to know who else, among those
who today deny our sacrifices, has done the same.”^99 The Russians, starting
with Brezhnev, tried to excuse themselves, but the rancor of the Yugoslavs died
hard, and they continued to nourish an underlying distrust. Kardelj eloquently
stressed his disapproval by refusing the invitation to take part in the celebra-
tions of the bicentenary of the Soviet Academy of Arts and Sciences.^100
The Americans hurried to exploit the situation. President Gerald Ford came
to Belgrade on 3–4 August 1975 and signed an agreement to provide $600 million
for the construction of a nuclear plant in Slovenia.^101 Tito accepted the offer,
hoping to heal relations with the US, which had deteriorated after 1973 over
divergent opinions about the Arab-Israeli war. The process of rapprochement,
however, was not easy, since there was no lack of new tensions and arguments.
At the beginning of 1976, for instance, the marshal interrupted the discussions
with Washington on acquiring TOW anti-tank missiles, which he badly needed,
as a sign of protest against the activity of Ustaša and Chetnik émigrés in the
United States who, according the Yugoslav press, were supported by local “hos-
tile elements.”^102 In October of the same year, he was furious again when the
presidential candidate for the Democratic Party, Jimmy Carter, who was in-
experienced in foreign policy, declared in a debate with his adversary Gerald
Ford that a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia, in the event of Tito’s death, was
improbable. He went further, stating that even if it did happen, he would not
employ troops in defense of the Balkan country, since such an event would not
threaten the security of the United States. Consequently, when Carter entered
the White House, the relations between Washington and Belgrade reached
their lowest point since the early postwar years. In 1978 Carter tried to atone,