The Later Years 415
between their countries. He also mentioned an opportunity for the LCY to
take part in a meeting of Soviet bloc leaders and asked Tito to engage in favor
of Moscow among the non-aligned countries and to stop the “unfriendly” pro-
paganda of the Yugoslav media against the Soviet Union. Tito listened to him,
apparently calm, but then lit a cigar, closed his notebook, and said: “It is late. It
is better to go to dinner. We will resume the discussion tomorrow.” He left
without waiting to see how the surprised Russians would react.^115
When alone with his colleagues, he commented irritably on the requests
proposed by Brezhnev and immediately appointed a task force to find the right
answers. The group worked through the night and came up with a plan: the
following day, the marshal flatly rejected all Soviet requests. In doing so, he
stressed that he was not speaking in his own name, but that he was interpreting
the opinion of all the present Yugoslav leaders, and certainly of the entire LCY
and of the Yugoslav people.^116 This firm attitude did not prevent Brezhnev
from proposing his demands again the following August, when the two met in
Moscow. Tito turned a deaf ear this time, too.^117 The Soviet “ultimatum,” as it
was labeled by Western journalists once the American agency UPI (United
Press International) had revealed the “eight requests of Brezhnev’s and the eight
nos from Tito,” alarmed the Yugoslavs, who interpreted it as further proof that
Moscow was not willing to renounce its hegemonic pretensions. In this con-
text, they were especially worried by the assertion of the CPSU ideologue,
Mikhail Suslov, that Soviet foreign policy had been 100 percent blameless from
1917 onward, including during the Stalinist era.^118 Because of such assertions,
Kardelj sent Tito a special message through Stane Dolanc during the last days
of his life, in which he predicted that escaping the Soviet threat would be the
main task, not just of present but also of future generations.^119
Tito’s hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union emerged at the end of 1976,
during the visit of French president Giscard d’Estaing to Belgrade. During
a private discussion the marshal confessed that he was skeptical about the idea
of general disarmament, although it was supported with much clamor by a
number of states at the United Nations as well as by Yugoslavia. It was, in his
opinion, pure propaganda. As Henry Kissinger affirmed during a meeting at
the White House with French, British, and West German top officials, the
Yugoslavs “have prepared very carefully what they’ll do if the Soviets do one,
two or three.” And his French colleague, Louis de Guiringaud, referring to his
recent trip to Belgrade, added: “They made it clear several times that they’re
determined to resist the Russians. I have never heard Tito say this before. This
time, we heard him for one or two hours. It was clear that they would defend
very strongly their independence, their integrity.”^120