430 The Later Years
she accused him of being a Russian spy. After a memorable quarrel, Tito gave
in, but on his return ordered an investigation that proved Popović innocent.^216
This was the turning point. Instead of maintaining her composure, Jovanka
became more and more aggressive, establishing an atmosphere of absolute ter-
ror at court. Being an old conspirator, Tito could not explain his wife’s behav-
ior, unless it was the result of a plot inspired by internal opposition or by foreign
secret services. He instructed Ivan Mišković, who at that moment seemed
omnipotent since he served as Tito’s special security adviser, to keep Jovanka
under strict surveillance to find out why she took his documents and to whom
she passed them.^217 Mišković discovered her daily contacts with Zagreb, in-
cluding with Ivan Krajačić (Stevo) and Miroslav Krleža, as well as her relation-
ships with several generals, in service and retired, and prominent politicians. He
also discovered her habit of hiding behind a curtain in the Belgrade residence,
one that separated the marshal’s office and library from his private apartments,
to listen to his conversations. (Bakarić claimed later that she did it systemati-
cally, betrayed only by the poodles that continuously ran from Tito to the cur-
tain and back again.)^218 In his memoir, Czechoslovak party leader Antonín
Novotný relates that during his visit in October 1967, Tito interrupted their
confidential conversation from time to time to see whether somebody was lis-
tening behind the door: “And this happened in his own palace.”^219
At the end of January 1974, a special commission was established to investi-
gate all those with whom Jovanka was in contact and to determine what influ-
ence they exerted on her. Tito wanted to know who was “ruining” his wife,
causing her “to create an atmosphere of tension around him.”^220 After a violent
quarrel with the leader of the commission, Ratko Dugonjić, one of the vice-
presidents of the federal Presidium, Jovanka began complaining that the
UDBA was controlling her and Tito. She claimed to be in possession of docu-
ments that seriously incriminated General Mišković, but she was not disposed
to show them to anyone. The members of the commission did not believe her,
but agreed that Jovanka wanted to seize power, starting with the Foreign Office
and the army. According to them, from 1958 the president’s wife followed for-
eign policy with particular attention, read diplomatic dispatches and intelli-
gence reports sent to her husband, and collaborated not just in organizing his
travels but also in selecting the most important state and party cadres.^221 At a
common session of the commission and the Executive Bureau, Kardelj declared
outspokenly: “She is a sick person. So sick as to be dangerous to Tito. We need
to think seriously about how to isolate her.” Stane Dolanc agreed: “If some-
thing happens, it will be our fault.” At a later session, which was attended by
Tito and, at his request, also by Jovanka, the marshal reproached his wife: “I
have been building this party for forty years and will not allow you to destroy