446 Tito’s Death and His Political Legacy, 1980
unity of the Arab world, and was also involved in the conflict between Ethiopia
and Somalia. He also attempted to convince the Soviets and the Cubans to
recall their troops from the Horn of Africa.^79 His commitment, however, was
primarily to the conference of the non-aligned. In September 1979 he went to
a meeting in Havana in the name of the “original principles” he had estab-
lished, to prevent its collapse. Immediately after the summit in Algiers in Sep-
tember 1973, it seemed that the Third World would be able to carry more
weight on the international stage, since the higher oil prices imposed by the
Arabs after the Israeli-Egyptian war in October of that year proved to what
extent the nations referred to generally as the “South” were able to influence the
wealthy “North.” Tito’s ideas on the need to set a common policy to prevent
the “rich becoming increasingly rich and the poor increasingly poor,” which
he reiterated on that occasion, appeared more relevant than ever. Although
the sharp rise in the price of oil and its derivatives damaged Yugoslavia, Tito
proclaimed in an interview with the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt
that the lesson the Arabs had taught to the West was “probably the most
important event in the history of mankind.”^80 He expected that the developed
countries would be forced to initiate a new dialogue with those that were less
developed but rich in raw materials. He lobbied the UN secretary general to
dedicate the next General Assembly mainly to the problem of bridging the
North-South gap. In September 1973 a special session was organized in which
these issues were discussed for the first time in the history of the UN. It ended
with a Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order and a program of action, which was considered a great success by the
non-aligned.^81
The idea of a more equitable economic order, which became the battle cry
of the Third World countries at the summit in Algiers, was not realized in
practice. On the contrary, following internal conflicts between its members the
Non-Aligned Movement experienced an identity crisis in the second half of
the seventies that weakened its influence at the UN. Tito was convinced that
the Americans were mainly responsible for this, because of their “imperialist
strategy of fragmentation,” which was designed to break up the united front of
the non-aligned countries with the help of “mercenary regimes.” He tried to
overcome the crisis by becoming a mediator in different regional conflicts and
a spokesman of common values, including the disarmament of the great pow-
ers and the establishment of a new economic order more attentive to develop-
ing countries. This policy was not without consequences for Yugoslavia. The
marshal’s support of various liberation movements aroused considerable dismay
in the West and involved the country in a series of controversies, which never-
theless did not escalate beyond verbal skirmishes. The situation was eloquently