Tito’s Death and His Political Legacy, 1980 447
summed up by Henry Kissinger in a discussion about Tito’s foreign policy with
his most important Western colleagues in December 1976: “Officially Wash-
ington understands that Yugoslavia must follow an independent line, for its
own security, which won’t always please us. But we have to shoot one across
their bow when they get too enthusiastic, as they did on Puerto Rico. But at the
same time, I understand what they’re up to.”^82
In this international context, Cuba and fifteen other countries began con-
testing the equidistance between the blocs, saying that, in the fight against
imperialism, the “natural” ally of the non-aligned should be the Soviet Union.
This theory was discussed at the congress in Havana, convened in early Sep-
tember 1979. The Cuban stance, which had already appeared at the Algiers
congress in 1973, was accompanied by a more or less blatant attempt to remove
Tito from the leadership of the movement, something unacceptable to the
Yugoslavs. According to them, this was a dangerous, essentially reactionary
policy, since it would undermine the unity of the non-aligned, weakening their
role and harming the further development of socialism as a “world process.”^83
Tito had no great sympathy for Fidel Castro who, in his pro-Soviet enthusi-
asm, had tried to boycott the Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference in the early
sixties and had even dared to assert that “the LCY is neither a party nor
communist.” The piqued Yugoslav diplomats assured the Americans that they
would not allow the Cubans to use the Non-Aligned Movement as a means of
advancing an anti-Western, pro-Soviet policy.^84 In the following years Tito
opposed Castro’s attempts to develop subversive activity in Latin America and
Africa, and supported the policy of friendship with all the Third World coun-
tries, regardless of their regimes, unlike the líder máximo, who would ally only
with the socialists.^85
Although extremely critical of American imperialism, in 1979 Tito was still
of the opinion that Soviet hegemony should not be underestimated. He decided
to oppose the radicalism of the Cuban dictator, believing himself to be the only
one capable of preventing the non-aligned from becoming Soviet dependents.
Firmly convinced that it was a question of “to be or not to be for our move-
ment,” he visited seven African and Asian countries in six months to get their
support. He even contemplated convening a counter-conference in Belgrade
because “Cuban behavior is really absurd. According to many, Cuba does not
have the credentials to host the summit.”^86
At the Havana Congress, which was the sixth conference of the non-aligned,
ninety-five members and twenty-one observers took part. At this world gath-
ering, the largest summit of heads of state in all of history, Tito played his
role of leader and teacher for the last time, trying to convince the non-aligned
not to be misled by those who wanted to engage them in “interests alien to the