64 World War Two and the Partisan Struggle
his boots before bed, put the telegrams in them, and put them back on.” This
lack of confidence in his comrades irritated Ranković. “What am I doing here?
What is my responsibility, if the telegrams from Moscow are hidden from me?”
Tito’s sharp answer was: “I am the secretary general of the party. I have the
right to decide what to tell you and the others.”^72
The sudden collapse of the Yugoslav Army surprised the communists, who
also believed in the myth of the heroic Serb tradition, linked to their anti-Turk
uprising at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and their opposition to the
Austro-Hungarian armies during the First World War. In 1944, Djilas con-
fessed to Manuilskii: “We made the mistake of thinking that the majority of
the officers, together with the General Staff, would resist the Germans. It did
not happen. Most of them surrendered.”^73 The leaders of the CPY thought that
Yugoslavia would resist for a month or more, giving them the opportunity to
strengthen their military organization and to connect with sympathizers, who
were numerous in the armed forces. In reality, the Wehrmacht encountered
almost no obstacles to its advance: “There was no serious resistance; it was a
triumphal march,” said Djilas.^74
At the session of the Croat CP on 8 April 1941, two days before the German
troops entered Zagreb, Tito openly recognized the blunder regarding the Royal
Army, highlighting the fact that during the dramatic events of the last two
weeks the communists had not been very efficient, since they should have
taken the initiative. After the aggression of the Axis and the occupation of the
country, the question of what to do became urgent.^75 Since Stalin was still
allied with Hitler, it was clear that room for maneuver was limited, as they
could not act openly against the occupiers. However, they were convinced
that the imperialist forces would soon give up the common fight and the time
would come when the suicidal struggle of the European bourgeoisie could be
exploited for the creation of the revolution, as Lenin had done during the First
World War.^76
On 10 April, when the Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed under
Italian and German tutelage, Tito installed a military committee, which he
headed, to give party members the necessary directives while the state was
collapsing. They were to collect and hide light weapons, organize military com-
mittees in all major cities and provinces, create small fighting groups and com-
manding cadres, and try to convince the soldiers not to surrender but instead to
go undercover with their arms.^77 On 15 April 1941, the CPY published a proc-
lamation to the Yugoslav peoples in which it condemned the foreign aggres-
sion, the betrayal of the royal regime, and the spread of chauvinism and hatred
between brothers, inviting the population “not to surrender in spirit.”
It read in part: “From this bloody imperialist war a new world will emerge....