intelligence kept its focus on what Konev showed and did not find what he
concealed, thereby achieving operational surprise.
On 13 July, the Stavka unleashed Konev’s 1st Ukrainian Front in the Lvov–
Sandomierz operation with the objective of defeating and destroying Army
Group North Ukraine, now under the command of Colonel-General Josef
Harpe. Harpe had at his disposal the 4th Panzer Army, the 1st Panzer Army,
and the 1st Hungarian Army, which was under the operational control of
Colonel-General Gottard Heinrici’s 1st Panzer Army because the Hungarians
were no longer considered reliable allies. He had Panzer armies in name only
with a total armour strength of 420 tanks, assault guns, and other armour
vehicles. He had about 370,000 men and could call upon air support from two
air fleets with about 1,000 aircraft. Against this force, Konev could deploy seven
armies and an air army with roughly 1.2 million troops, 2,050 tanks and self-
propelled artillery, 16,000 tubes, and 3,250 aircraft.
Konev’s plan envisioned penetrations of the German tactical defences at several
points and the introduction of second-echelon mechanized forces to complete
encirclements and form the external exploitation force, striking into the enemy’s
operational depths. He held General Aleksei Zhadov’s 5th Guards Army as a front
reserve. He kept his tank armies for deep exploitation, but increased the density
of armoured forces with his combined-arms armies to ensure their ability to
penetrate the tactical defences. 64 He achieved overwhelming favourable correla-
tions of forces in manpower, armour, artillery, and aviation on the axes of
attack. 65 The 3rd Guards, the 1st Tank, and the 13th Armies were to advance
on the axis Rava-Ruska, and the 60th, 38th, 3rd Guards Tank, and the 4th Tank
Armies were to advance on the Lvov axis. 66 Once through the enemy’s tactical
depths, their pincers were to encircle and destroy the German XIII Corps.
Konev began his offensive with a tactical reconnaissance of the German
frontlines on the evening of 13 July. It revealed that the main enemy forces
were falling back on their second line of positions behind a weak rearguard in
order to escape the effects of the Soviet artillery preparation. With this informa-
tion, he authorized the 3rd Guards and 13th Armies to advance without artillery
preparation and rely upon tactical aviation to strike the enemy’s tactical strong
points. 67 The Soviet attack swept aside the rearguard and pre-empted the estab-
lishment of a stable defence on the second line of trenches. The 3rd Guards Army
opened a breach on the Rava-Ruska axis and the 1st Guards Tank Army was sent
to exploit, seizing a bridgehead across the Bug River and advancing on Lublin.
A counter-attack by the grossly understrength 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions of
the 1st Panzer Army failed. The 13th Army turned south to become the right arm
of an envelopment of the German XIII Corps at Brody. 68
While the northern attack enjoyed success from the beginning, the southern
attack towards Lvov, which began on 14 July, ran into stiff resistance. The initial
penetration by the 60th Army of the tactical defence was only 3–4 km and
German re-enforcement sought to blunt the Soviet offensive. The 60th Army
managed to create a narrow corridor through the German tactical defences at
Koltov and found itself engaged with German forces seeking to close the corridor.
The Tsarist and Soviet Operational Art, 1853–1991 85