The Evolution of Operational Art. From Napoleon to the Present

32–40. See also Viktor Miasnikov, ‘Kak kovalas’ asimmetrichnost’’,Nezavisimoe voen-

noe obozrenie, 17 October 2008, 15.

82. William E. Odom,The Collapse of the Soviet Military(New Haven, CT: Yale University
    Press, 1998), 118ff.


83. Vitaly Shlykov, ‘Fatal Mistakes of the U.S. and Soviet Intelligence: Part One’,Interna-
    tional Affairs, XLII, nos. 5–6 (1996), 158–77.


84. Ibid.


85. N. N. Moiseev,Sotsializm i informatika(Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoy literatury,
    1988), 62ff.


86. Makhmut A. Gareev and Vladimir Slipchenko,Budushchaia voina(Moscow: OGI,
    2005).


87. Roi Medvedev,Chto chital Stalin: Liudi i kniga v totalitarnom obshchestve(Moscow:
    Izdatel’stvo ‘Prava Cheloveka’, 2005), 63.


88. The most important documents for the guidance of operations came in the form of
    lessons learnt from other operations and collected by the directorate for the utilization
    of war experience of the general staff, which were published periodically between 1942
    and 1947. See USSR, Upravlenie po ispolzovaniiu opyta voiny, General’nogo Shtaba
    Krasnoi Armii,Sbornik materialov po izucheniiu opyta voiny, 26 vols. (Moscow:
    Voennoe izdatel’stvo Narodnogo Kmoddariata Oborony, 1942–7).

The Tsarist and Soviet Operational Art, 1853–1991 95