Bidwell’s and Graham’s definition of doctrine linked it directly to operational
art. Like doctrine, operational art looks both ways, to tactics and to strategy; like
doctrine, operational art aspires to harmonize the two. But the complexions of
both doctrine and operational art are dependent on which direction they are
pointed towards at any one time. In 1909, the year in whichField Service
Regulations Part I: Operationswas first published by the general staff, much
doctrine was rooted in tactics. For Bidwell and Graham, writing about the two
world wars, doctrine was a professional matter, divorced from its political
context, and, therefore, located more at the interface between operations and
tactics than between operations and strategy. 3 Since the end of the Cold War,
doctrine has shaped strategy more than tactics. During the 1990s, according to
Markus Ma ̈der, British doctrine focused on the ‘military-strategic level’, which is
‘the bridge that links policy objectives with operational effect’. 4 By 2009, with
doctrine focused on irregular war as much as regular, its aspirations to be
apolitical could not be sustained against the weight of strategic expectation
which it had to carry.
It follows that doctrine is not the same as operational art. Indeed Graham, in
an essay published in the same year asFire-Power, specifically associated doctrine
with tactics, rather than with the operational level of war. 5 In this, he was in good
company: tactics, Clausewitz concluded, ‘is that part of war in which theory can
develop most fully into positive doctrine’. 6 Troops in combat need routines,
common practices, both to create cohesion and to provide instinctive responses
when the confusion and chaos of battle are unleashed. 7 Doctrine at this level
comes closer to dogma: in the nineteenth century, it could be reflected in the
orders of non-commissioned officers on the drill square more than in the
directives issued by generals. Doctrine today, as it approaches the strategic levels
of war, is less happy with dogma: the current catchphrase is that doctrine informs
soldiers how to think, not what to think. NATO’s 2003 definition of doctrine
reflects this ambiguity: ‘it is authoritative, but requires judgement in it applica-
tion’. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of the British army in 2009
were the products of doctrine (although rarely recognized as such), but they were
not manifestations of operational art. Operational art, therefore, does not have to
be predicated on doctrine. If this were not the case, the British history of
operational art would be very short. The first formal British doctrine, identified
as such,Design for Military Operations—the British Military Doctrine, was not
published until 1989; by then, official publications of the British army had been
using the word ‘operations’ for eighty years, and individual British soldiers had
been employing it in unofficial publications for twice as long.
This is not just a matter of the relationship between the so-called levels of war:
tactics, operations, strategy, and policy; it is also a reflection on the nature of
generalship. Operational art is practised by generals. Most commanders have a
secure grasp of tactical procedures and the majority are then inclined to see the
operational level of war in comparable terms: for them, the purpose of doctrine is
to create common standards and routines. The intention is to make a large
organization function along similar lines and pull towards common goals. But
Operational Art and Britain, 1909–2009 97