irregular wars were subsumed within the same general framework. At its most
basic level, this was shown by the incorporation of ‘small wars’ within the same
operational publication as that devoted to ‘big wars’. At the conceptual level, it
was reflected in the relationship between strategy and tactics. The cardinal
principle in wars against an uncivilized enemy was that his susceptibility ‘to
moral influences is a most important factor in the campaign’, and that, therefore,
‘a vigorous offensive, strategical as well as tactical, is always the safest method of
conducting operations’. 39 Similarly, the second paragraph of the opening chapter
of the text as a whole asserted that ‘success in war depends more on moral than
physical qualities’, and the chapter on battle began with the statement that
‘decisive success in battle can be gained only by a vigorous offensive’. 40 Any
distinction between colonial conflicts and wars against European opponents lay
in the application of the principles, not in the principles themselves.Field Service
Regulations Part II: Organization and Administration, published at the same time
as part I, made this point crystal clear:
Although the strength and composition of the forces in the field must vary according to the
enemy to be encountered, and the nature of the prospective theatre of operations, yet the
general principles which govern their organization remain practically the same whether
operations are conducted under civilized or uncivilized conditions, and whether a small
force or a large one is employed. It is only the application of principles in detail which vary,
and once the principles themselves are clearly understood, it is comparatively simple to
adjust such details to any given case. 41
Field Service Regulationsfollowed a sequence from strategy to tactics, the purpose
of strategy being the tactical pay-off, to bring the enemy to battle, the decisive act
in wars of any and all types. This relationship between tactics and strategy was the
same as that which Henderson had spelt out in 1902, but it should not necessarily
be regarded as Henderson’s last word on the subject. The sixth edition of ‘Notes
on strategy by Colonel Henderson compiled for the use of students at the Staff
College’, dated 1912 and to be found in William Robertson’s papers, set out a
more Clausewitzian relationship between strategy and tactics, as well as between
strategy and policy. Addressing the latter point first, Henderson stated that
strategy and policy must be in harmony. What followed then switched to a
more Jominian tack, stressing the choice of objectives in war, the need to adopt
a line of march which both covered one’s own communications and threatened
the enemy’s, and the primacy of concentrating superior force on the decisive
point. The fourteenth and fifteenth headings stressed that tactics could be a
departure point, rather than a terminus, for strategy: victory in battle created a
new strategic situation, and strategic pursuit—not battle—was dubbed ‘the
decisive operation in war’. Henderson still did not address ‘operational art’ as a
distinct topic, but his principles included ideas which would be subsumed by that
heading. His sixteenth principle was that ‘the strategic counterstroke is the best
weapon of the defence’ and his eighteenth that ‘MANOEUVRE IS THE ANTI-
DOTE OF INTRENCHMENTS’. 42
Operational Art and Britain, 1909–2009 107